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Article 
Bondholders and Securities Class Actions 
James J. Park† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Securities class actions are typically brought by sharehold-
ers of the corporation who allege they purchased stock at a 
price inflated by fraud. Yet a company’s common stock is not 
the only type of security protected by the securities laws. Bond 
investors may also bring suit for securities fraud and are in-
creasingly asserting claims through bondholder class actions.1 
Drawing upon a data set of 1660 securities class actions filed 
from 1996 through 2005, this Article argues that bondholders 
are playing a greater role in securities class actions than previ-
ously recognized and that this role is likely to grow.2 Securities 
class actions have evolved so that they not only protect share-
holders, but address fraud that benefits shareholders at the ex-
pense of bondholders. 
 
†  Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. For helpful comments, thanks 
to Stephen Bainbridge, Stanislav Dolgopolov, George Georgiev, Maria Loumiti, 
Urska Velikonja, and workshop participants at the American Association of 
Law Schools 2014 Annual Meeting (Section on Securities Regulation), Ameri-
can Law and Economics Association 2014 Annual Meeting, Brooklyn Law 
School Junior Faculty Forum, 2013 Corporate and Securities Litigation Work-
shop, UCLA School of Law Junior Business Law Faculty Forum, and the 
UCLA School of Law Faculty Workshop. For helpful research assistance, 
thanks to Thomas Fuell, Alex Nguyen, and Andrew Lee. Copyright © 2014 by 
James J. Park. 
 1. When referring to “bonds,” this Article means non-convertible debt se-
curities with a maturity of one year or more.  
 2. A number of articles by business school professors have inquired into 
related issues. See, e.g., Michael Hartzmark et al., Fraud on the Market: Anal-
ysis of the Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
654 (discussing efficiency of bond markets); Mary Billings et al., Shareholder 
Class Action Suits and the Bond Market (May 2011) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=1984666 (examining whether 
bond prices react to the filing of securities class actions). No such study focus-
es on the frequency and characteristics of bondholder class actions.  
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At first glance, it seems unlikely that bondholder involve-
ment in securities class actions would be of much importance. 
Because they have priority over shareholders in the firm’s capi-
tal structure, bondholders are less likely to suffer losses from 
fraud than shareholders. In any case where bondholders are 
the victim of securities fraud, shareholders will suffer much 
greater losses. When bondholders assert claims alongside 
shareholders, their claims might be perceived as insignificant 
and redundant. Bondholder recoveries in securities class ac-
tions could be explained as the result of opportunistic rent-
seeking by class action attorneys seeking to obtain part of a se-
curities class action settlement. 
Even if bondholders recover less frequently and in smaller 
amounts than shareholders, bondholder class actions may still 
be of importance because bondholders are most likely to obtain 
damages in the most serious cases of fraud. For example, the 
most prominent case where bondholders achieved a recovery 
through the securities laws involved WorldCom, the telecomm 
company that collapsed in the wake of accounting fraud in 
2002, where bondholders recovered about $5 billion.3 The 
WorldCom settlement was for a fraud that resulted in the 
bankruptcy of a major public company. The fraud was so signif-
icant that in a rare event, board members were required to per-
sonally contribute to the settlement.4 While the WorldCom 
fraud had social implications in its own right, the involvement 
of bondholders highlighted how the worst frauds do more than 
cause shareholder losses. 
Moreover, if bondholders suffer distinct injury from securi-
ties fraud, their claims are not simply redundant with share-
holder actions. In many cases, companies commit securities 
fraud in the hope they will increase shareholder wealth by tak-
ing on additional risk that is not disclosed. Bondholders do not 
benefit from such a course of action and can be harmed when 
such risk is hidden. In such cases, securities fraud essentially 
distributes wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Even if 
 
 3. Gretchen Morgenson, Bank to Pay $2 Billion To Settle WorldCom 
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/17/ 
business/17worldcom.html?_r=1& (“The bondholders in the case had sought a 
total of $9 billion in damages. Of the $6 billion recovered from the banks, $5 
billion will go to bond investors and $1 billion will go to holders of WorldCom 
stock. The $5 billion recovered for bondholders is 56 percent of the amount 
sought by the plaintiffs in the case.”).  
 4. See Brooke A. Masters & Kathleen Day, 10 Ex-WorldCom Directors 
Agree to Settlement, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at E1. 
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some bondholder involvement in securities class actions is the 
result of rent-seeking, to the extent that unique arguments can 
be asserted by bondholders, a role for bondholders in securities 
class actions is justified. 
This Article is the first to present extensive data on bond-
holder actions. The evidence from 1996 through 2005 provides 
support for the view that bondholder involvement in securities 
class actions is increasing. Bondholder recoveries were rare for 
the first five years covered by the data set, averaging about 3% 
of settlements from 1996 through 2000. The rate of bondholder 
recoveries increased to an average of 8% of settlements from 
2001 through 2005. Bondholder recoveries have not only be-
come more frequent, they are disproportionately represented in 
the largest settlements of securities class actions. For the peri-
od covered by the data set, bondholders recovered in 4 of the 5 
largest settlements and 19 of the 30 largest settlements.  
Many of these bondholder class actions raise allegations of 
distinct harm to bondholders. A significant number of bond-
holder class actions are associated with a downgrade of the 
company’s credit rating, an event signaling a substantial in-
crease in the credit risk of a company. Bondholder class actions 
also often arise out of bond sales where risks were not ade-
quately disclosed to bond purchasers. Both situations can in-
volve transfers of wealth from bondholders to shareholders. 
The growing involvement of bondholders in securities class 
actions is likely to continue. In the first year of the data set, 
1996, less than 10% of securities class actions sought recovery 
for non-shareholder plaintiffs. Over the next decade, plaintiffs 
began certifying broader classes that included bondholders. It 
has now become routine for a securities class action to allege 
claims on behalf of all investors of the issuer’s publicly traded 
securities. By 2005, close to half of securities class actions 
brought claims on behalf of such a broader class. 
The increase in bondholder recoveries illustrates how the 
nature of securities fraud can change over time. There is a ten-
dency in the literature to assume that securities class actions 
have a fixed essence. The reality is far more complex. In some 
periods, cries of securities fraud appear to be opportunistic at-
tempts to recover losses from temporary stock price fluctua-
tions. In more recent times, frauds have been associated with 
serious declines in the fortune of public companies. Securities 
class actions are evolving as the nature of securities fraud 
changes. For example, in earlier years, suits alleging fraudu-
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lent securities offerings primarily targeted emerging companies 
selling stock in an initial public offering (IPO). Now, the most 
significant recoveries arising out of securities offerings involve 
bond sales by seasoned public companies.  
Bondholder class actions also have implications for corpo-
rate governance. Corporate law has traditionally focused on the 
rights of shareholders, who are protected by fiduciary duties, 
and not bondholders, whose rights are defined by contract.5 
With bondholder class actions, an investor who purchases a 
bond at a price that does not reflect the true risk of a corpora-
tion’s insolvency can recover damages. A recovery by bondhold-
ers typically shifts funds from shareholders to bondholders, 
providing a remedy for reckless decisions meant to benefit 
shareholders. Bondholder class actions highlight how fraud 
harms non-shareholder constituencies, while respecting the 
traditional corporate law distinction between shareholders and 
bondholders.  
Given the unique position of bondholder plaintiffs, in some 
circumstances, courts should treat bondholder class actions dif-
ferently from shareholder class actions. The fraud-on-the-
market presumption,6 which facilitates certification of a class 
by assuming that all investors uniformly rely upon the integri-
ty of the market price for a security, should be modified for 
bondholders.7 Investors rely more on credit rating agencies 
 
 5. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (holding that 
a bondholder “acquires no equitable interest, and remains a creditor of the 
corporation whose interests are protected by the contractual terms of the in-
denture”); Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1061 (Del. 1986) (“The 
rights of debenture holders are controlled by the terms of the indenture under 
which the securities are issued.”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (noting that rights of bondholders are 
“fixed by agreement”); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 
1986) (“The terms of the contractual relationship agreed to and not broad con-
cepts such as fairness define the corporation’s obligation to its bondholders.”); 
see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1990) (“For bondholders, this has meant that 
the bond contract, typically negotiated and drafted by corporate management, 
serves as the font of all bondholder rights and duties.”). 
 6. The U.S. Supreme Court recently rejected an attempt to overrule the 
decision establishing this presumption. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408–11 (2014). 
 7. Because bond markets are less developed than stock markets, one 
commentator predicts that bondholders are less likely to satisfy various class 
certification hurdles. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking 
Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 328 (2010) (“Because the 
debt markets are normally not considered to be efficient . . . plaintiffs in cases 
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than markets in assessing the risk of corporate bonds. To the 
extent that a fraud substantially distorts a credit rating, courts 
ought to presume that bondholders uniformly relied on such 
credit rating. In addition, to the extent that bondholder class 
actions raise distinct theories of harm, bondholders should be 
represented in a separate sub-class from shareholders by inde-
pendent counsel. Such representation could enhance the ability 
of bondholders to assert their interests in securities class ac-
tions. 
Part I of this Article discusses bond valuation and the par-
ticular way in which securities fraud impacts bonds. Part II 
discusses two possible hypotheses with respect to the im-
portance of bondholder class actions. Part III presents evidence 
on bondholder recoveries and their characteristics from a data 
set of securities class actions filed from 1996 through 2005. 
Part IV contends that increasing bondholder recoveries are evi-
dence of the changing nature of securities fraud. Part V dis-
cusses the role bondholder class actions play in corporate gov-
ernance. Part VI argues that courts should recognize the 
differences between bondholders and shareholders in adjudicat-
ing securities class actions.  
I.  BOND INVESTORS AND SECURITIES FRAUD   
Compared to shareholders, bondholders have less reason to 
be concerned about securities fraud. This is because, as will be 
discussed in Section A, bonds are valued differently than 
stocks. Bond prices are not as vulnerable as stock prices to 
changes in the company’s expected profitability. Section B de-
scribes how securities fraud can affect bondholders. Certain 
frauds can result in the inflation of bond prices, resulting in 
losses when the fraud is revealed. Bondholders are most con-
cerned about frauds that obscure the risk that a company will 
default on its debt obligations.  
A. BOND VALUATION  
The value of any security should approximate the net pre-
sent value of the expected cash flows the owner of that security 
expects to receive.8 For the bond investor, those cash flows in-
 
involving debt securities need to sue on an individual or consolidated basis, 
thereby again downsizing the role of the opt-out class action.”).  
 8. See, e.g., Hartzmark et al., supra note 2, at 669 (“The price of bonds is 
calculated as the present value of the expected future cash flows they gener-
ate.”). 
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clude all of the expected interest payments from the issuer as 
well as the return of principal at the end of the bond’s maturi-
ty.9 These values can change.10 Over time, the value of the bond 
can fluctuate so that when traded in the secondary market, a 
bond initially purchased for $1000 will trade at a discount, say 
$900, or a premium, say $1100. 
A bond’s price depends much less on the future growth of a 
company’s earnings than the price of a stock. The value of a 
stock depends on the market’s assessment of whether the un-
derlying corporation will be profitable. Unlike the shareholder, 
the bondholder has a contractual right to receive interest pay-
ments and the return of principal, regardless of whether the 
firm has earnings. This fixed return is safer than the residual 
return captured by shareholders. Bondholders have priority 
over shareholders in bankruptcy, and thus they benefit from an 
equity cushion that absorbs most fluctuations in firm value. 
New information should only affect bond valuations if it chang-
es the investor’s assessment that the bond issuer will fulfill its 
obligation to pay interest and return the principal when the 
bond matures.11  
Corporate bondholders will thus assess the risk of default 
of the particular issuer,12 that is, credit risk, when calculating 
 
 9. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 631 
(N.D. Ala. 2009) (“A corporate bond reflects a debt owed by the borrow-
er/corporation to the bondholder that calls for periodic payments of interest at 
a specified rate, as well as a lump sum payment of the principal amount at a 
designated maturity date.”).  
 10. A variety of factors affect a bond’s valuation. See, e.g., Robert C. Mer-
ton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, 29 
J. FIN. 449, 449 (1974) (noting that the primary risks affecting bond prices are 
interest rate risk and credit risk); see also Mark S. Klock et al., Does Corporate 
Governance Matter to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 693, 
695–96 (2005) (finding that antitakeover governance provisions reduce the 
cost of debt).  
 11. See, e.g., William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bar-
gaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1541 (1982) (“The fixed return 
of the debt claim is designed to appeal to an investor whose aversion to risk is 
higher than that of a residual claimant in the same firm or to an investor who 
does not want to be concerned with the profit-maximization decisions of the 
firm.”). 
 12. The risk of default translates into a higher interest rate for corporate 
bonds relative to risk-free U.S. government bonds. See, e.g., Francis A. 
Longstaff et al., Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evi-
dence from the Credit Default Swap Market, 60 J. FIN. 2213, 2214 (2005) (find-
ing that the risk of default “accounts for the majority of the corporate spread 
across all credit ratings”). Studies differ in the influence of default risk on the 
premium paid by corporate issuers. See, e.g., Edwin J. Elton et al., Explaining 
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the price they will pay for a bond issued by that company.13 If a 
corporation becomes insolvent, a bond investor could lose part 
or all of its investment.14 While bondholders can expect to re-
cover more than shareholders in bankruptcy, they often suffer 
substantial losses.15 Corporate bond prices will thus fluctuate 
based on the market’s assessment of the safety of the corporate 
issuer relative to other corporate issuers.16 As the risk of de-
fault grows higher, the price of a corporate bond will fall.  
Bond investors rely on both credit ratings and bond cove-
nants to reduce the cost of calculating the risk of default. Rat-
ing agencies assess the creditworthiness of an issuer’s bonds for 
a fee, essentially grading a bond based on a number of different 
criteria. The highest rating, AAA, would indicate that the issu-
er is very unlikely to default.17 Lower ratings, such as BBB, can 
mean there is a non-trivial risk of default.18 The interest rate 
paid for a bond rated AAA will be lower than the interest rate 
paid for a bond rated BBB because investors will accept a lower 
 
the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds, 56 J. FIN. 247, 249 (2001) (finding that 
default risk only explains 25% of corporate spread).  
 13. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec. Deriv. & 
“ERISA” Litig.), 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (noting that bond 
prices depend on factors including “the likelihood of default, the most critical 
factor”). 
 14. See, e.g., Pierre Collin-Dufresne et al., The Determinants of Credit 
Spread Changes, 56 J. FIN. 2177, 2178 (2001) (“[C]redit spreads obtain for two 
fundamental reasons: (1) there is a risk of default, and (2) in the event of de-
fault, the bondholder receives only a portion of the promised payments.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over 
Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Com-
panies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 142 (1990) (reporting that bondholders recover 
between 0.5% to 81.6% of unsecured claims); see also Kenneth M. Ayotte & 
Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 511, 518 (2009) (“[I]n 22 percent of the cases, secured claims exceed-
ed the value of the company.”). 
 16. Corporate bond prices will fluctuate in response to changes in interest 
rates and changes relating to credit risk. See, e.g., Hartzmark et al., supra 
note 2, at 670 (“[D]aily changes in corporate bond prices and yields are most 
often a function of only three of these factors: changes in risk-free Treasury 
rates of interest, changes in risk premiums for similar-risk corporate bonds, 
and changes in the company’s likelihood of default on its obligations.”).  
 17. Historically, only 1% of AAA bond issuers default over a ten-year peri-
od. See S&P, 2011 Annual U.S. Corporate Default Study and Rating Transi-
tions, tbl.13 (Mar. 23, 2012), available at https://www.standardandpoors.com/ 
ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245331026864.  
 18. Historically, about 5% of issuers of BBB bonds default over a ten-year 
period. See id.  
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rate of return for a bond with a lower risk of default.19 A bond’s 
rating can be downgraded as a company’s risk of default in-
creases, which adversely affects the price of the bond.20 Bond-
holders will also typically be protected by contractual provi-
sions, or covenants, that prohibit certain conduct that would 
increase the risk of default.21  
While ratings and bond covenants reduce the cost of moni-
toring, they are not completely effective in protecting bondhold-
ers from losses. Much has been written about the deficiencies of 
credit rating agencies and the unreliability of their ratings.22 
Bondholder covenants are rarely enforced because bond trus-
tees have insufficient incentive to monitor for breaches.23 More-
over, bondholder covenants and ratings tend not to be effective 
 
 19. The credit rating is especially influential in the initial pricing of a cor-
porate bond. See, e.g., Martin S. Fridson & M. Christopher Garman, Determi-
nants of Spreads on New High-Yield Bonds, 54 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 28, 34 (1998) 
(“Ratings . . . have by far the highest correlation of any variable with new-
issue spreads.”).  
 20. See, e.g., Elton et al., supra note 12, at 258 (“[S]ome of the bonds orig-
inally rated AAA have migrated to lower-rated categories where there is some 
probability of default.”); see also Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec. 
Deriv. & “ERISA” Litig.), 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 757 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (noting 
that Enron’s credit rating was downgraded after it announced write-downs). 
 21. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contract-
ing: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 125–46 (1979) (de-
scribing various bond covenants). Bondholder covenants tend to offer less pro-
tection than covenants for bank loans. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Adapting to 
the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1931 (2013) 
(“[P]rivate debt contains far more covenants than public debt.”); Charles K. 
Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corpo-
rate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 651 (2009) (noting that public bonds have 
“typically less restrictive covenants in light of greater publicly available in-
formation about those borrowers, the higher cost to monitor and enforce com-
pliance, and a decline in the ability to mitigate credit risk through contract” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 22. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: 
Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 619, 
623–24 (1999) (concluding that credit rating agencies have thrived because of 
the sale of regulatory licenses rather than the accuracy of their ratings). 
 23. See, e.g., Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corpo-
rate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 470 (1999) (“[T]he indenture trustee is not 
obliged to engage in active monitoring, its compensation creates no incentive 
to expend effort, and it does not have the authority to renegotiate covenants.”); 
see also Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of 
Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 150 (2009) 
(noting that bank loan covenant violations are common). However, the rise of 
active investors has resulted in more aggressive enforcement of bond cove-
nants. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the En-
forcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 283 (2009). 
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in preventing fraud.24 If a company is committed to manipulat-
ing the price of its securities, it is unlikely that it will carefully 
follow the mandates of covenants or rating agencies.25 Bond-
holders thus remain vulnerable to securities fraud despite the-
se protections. 
B. THE IMPACT OF SECURITIES FRAUD ON BONDS 
When a company commits securities fraud, it generally 
makes a misstatement relating to its past, present, or future 
performance. A material misstatement might affirmatively in-
flate the price of the company’s stock, or it might prevent a 
stock price decline. Investors who purchased stock at the in-
flated price will suffer losses when the truth is revealed and the 
stock price moves to its appropriate value.  
Like stock investors, bond investors rely on the company’s 
disclosures in making an investment and monitoring it.26 How-
ever, because of the characteristics of bonds discussed earlier, 
bondholders are less vulnerable than shareholders to securities 
 
 24. Broadly worded contractual provisions are limited in their ability to 
prohibit fraudulent conduct. See, e.g., Amihud et al., supra note 23, at 464 
(“Some corporate actions that harm creditors—for example, actions that in-
crease the business risk associated with the company’s operations—are diffi-
cult to specify contractually . . . .”). Rating agencies generally rely upon the 
issuer’s representations in computing ratings, and thus are limited in their 
ability to detect fraud. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Pub-
lic Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6 (noting that 
because “rating agencies make their rating determination, based primarily on 
information provided by the issuer of securities, a rating is no more reliable 
than that information” and therefore “[r]atings do not cover the risk of fraud”).  
 25. Indeed, securities fraud is a way to circumvent bond covenants. See, 
e.g., Baruch Lev, Corporate Earnings: Facts and Fiction, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 
27, 36 (2003) (observing that firms manipulate accounting to avoid violation of 
contractual commitments with bondholders and other lenders); Smith & 
Warner, supra note 21, at 144 (“Restrictions on the shareholders’ behavior can 
be relaxed by manipulating the accounting numbers which define the con-
straints.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Leland E. Crabbe & Christopher M. Turner, Does the Liquid-
ity of a Debt Issue Increase with Its Size? Evidence from the Corporate Bond 
and Medium-Term Note Markets, 50 J. FIN. 1719, 1721 (1995) (“Investors ana-
lyze a variety of types of information about a borrower, such as its leverage 
ratios, cash flow, management expertise, litigation risk, credit ratings, cyclical 
risk, and industry risk.”); Smith & Warner, supra note 21, at 143 
(“[B]ondholders find financial statements to be useful in ascertaining whether 
the provisions of the contract have been (or are about to be) violated.”); see also 
Peter D. Easton et al., Initial Evidence on the Role of Accounting Earnings in 
the Bond Market, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 721, 739–45 (2009) (finding that bonds 
trade more around earnings announcements).  
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fraud.27 While changes in a company’s stock price are common, 
so long as the fraud does not impact the perception of the bond 
market that the company will remain solvent, bond prices 
should not be affected by the fraud.28  
The situation can change if the securities fraud hides in-
formation that significantly affects the probability of corporate 
default.29 A fraud may hide information that would fundamen-
tally change the market’s assessment of whether a company is 
in danger of insolvency. For example, a number of studies have 
found that bond markets respond to accounting restatements, 
which cast doubt on the reliability of the company’s financial 
statements.30 Without trust in the company’s financials, the 
bond market may perceive that the risk of default has in-
creased. Moreover, credit rating agencies can respond to fraud 
by downgrading the company’s debt, signaling to the market 
that the debt is riskier.  
A bond investor who purchased the bond on the assump-
tion that the company had a certain credit risk will see the val-
ue of that investment decline. The bondholder would have to 
discount the price of the bond to sell it to another investor. In 
some cases, a company may find that its credibility is so dam-
 
 27. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad 
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
1059, 1085 (1990) (“Debt securities will be more insulated from the shocks as-
sociated with bad news than will equity securities.”). 
 28. The price of bonds with higher credit ratings will fluctuate less than 
lower rated bonds. Because the risk of default for an AAA bond has historical-
ly been low, only the most extreme developments will affect the market’s as-
sessment of the price of an AAA bond. In contrast, high yield or junk bonds 
with lower credit ratings are at greater risk of default. Lower rated bonds will 
move more like stocks in response to negative information than higher rated 
bonds. See, e.g., Simon H. Kwan, Firm-Specific Information and the Correla-
tion Between Individual Stocks and Bonds, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 65 (1996) 
(“AAA-rated bonds are insensitive to firm-specific information, thus they re-
semble riskless bonds more than they do risky bonds.”). 
 29. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 635–36 
(N.D. Ala. 2009) (“[M]aterial new unexpected information concerning the cre-
ditworthiness of the issuer or the prospect of default on bond obligations would 
be of interest to bondholders and affect the price.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Anneleen Cornil, The Impact of Accounting Restatements on 
a Firm’s Cost of Public Debt, 2009 REV. BUS. & ECON. 147, 148 (2009) (finding 
that restatements increase cost of debt by 6.2%); Charles Shi & Sanjian Wil-
liam Zhang, Accounting Restatements and the Cost of Debt Capital (Chinese 
Accounting Professors’ Assoc. of N. Am., Working Paper 2008), available at 
http://www.capana.net/download/confpaper1.pdf (finding negative return for 
bonds of restating companies). In addition, bond prices tend to react negatively 
to the filing of a shareholder class action. See Billings et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
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aged that it cannot access capital markets. Without liquidity, 
the company could be forced to file for bankruptcy, and bond-
holders may suffer losses in the reorganization or liquidation if 
the company’s assets do not cover all of its liabilities.   
II.  BOND INVESTORS AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS   
As with shareholders, bondholders can bring suit under the 
federal securities laws if they suffer damages from securities 
fraud. Given that bondholders are generally shielded from 
fraud, one might predict that bondholder class actions will not 
play a significant role relative to shareholder class actions. Sec-
tion A briefly describes the two major causes of action for secu-
rities fraud, focusing on the particular issues raised when 
bondholders are the plaintiffs. Section B then describes two hy-
potheses concerning the importance of bondholder involvement 
in securities class actions.  
A. BONDHOLDER CAUSES OF ACTION 
As with shareholder class actions, there are two major 
types of securities fraud claims that can be pursued through 
bondholder class actions. The first requires an offering of bonds 
by an issuer to public investors. The second relates to trading of 
bonds on the secondary market. The first type of claim, if avail-
able, offers a more favorable liability standard than the second.  
1. Section 11  
As they do with stock, companies periodically sell bonds to 
investors through public offerings. Investors who purchase 
bonds in such offerings are protected by section 11 of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933, which provides a damages remedy for fraud 
in the registration statement filed by the issuer with the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC).31 Liability for a section 
11 claim does not require any showing of fraudulent intent.32 
The issuer is strictly liable for any decline in value of the bonds 
if there is a material misrepresentation in the registration 
statement.33 Third parties such as underwriters and auditors 
are also liable though they have a due diligence defense if they 
 
 31. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). 
 32. See id.  
 33. There is a presumption that any decline in the value of the security 
was caused by the material misrepresentation, but that presumption can be 
overcome if the defendant proves some other cause for the decline. See 15 
U.S.C. § 77k(e)(3). 
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performed a “reasonable investigation,” had “reasonable ground 
to believe,” and “did believe” that the registration statement 
was not materially misleading.34  
There are at least two reasons why a section 11 claim is 
more easily asserted by a bondholder than a shareholder. First, 
the courts require an investor to trace their purchase of a secu-
rity to a particular offering in order to bring suit under section 
11.35 This tracing requirement can be more difficult to satisfy 
for a purchaser of common stock. If a company makes more 
than one offering of common stock, it can be impossible for an 
investor to identify which offering the stock he purchased came 
from, as one share of common stock has the same characteris-
tics as any other share of common stock.36 In contrast, bonds 
are easier to trace because bonds issued at different times have 
differing terms that facilitate identification. Second, issuers 
tend to issue bonds more than stock because a stock offering 
will dilute the stake of existing shareholders. It is thus more 
likely that a fraud will coincide with a bond offering than a 
stock offering.  
2. Rule 10b-5  
As with stocks, bonds often trade among investors in a sec-
ondary market. The price of the bond will be determined in part 
by the market’s assessment of the issuer’s disclosures. If those 
disclosures materially inflate the price of a bond in the second-
ary market, a damaged purchaser of the bond can bring suit 
under SEC Rule 10b-5 (Rule 10b-5),37 which was enacted pur-
suant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.38 
A Rule 10b-5 action may be a bondholder’s only remedy if the 
fraud occurs long after a public bond offering.39 
 
 34. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A). 
 35. See, e.g., DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170, 176–78 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(discussing tracing requirement). 
 36. See Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 465-67 (2000). 
 37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
 38. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 39. The statute of limitations for a section 11 claim is one year. See 15 
U.S.C. § 77k. Though its most important application is to secondary market 
fraud, Rule 10b-5 is often the basis for claims arising out of offering fraud. If 
the offering is exempt from registration, section 11 will not apply, and the 
plaintiff must proceed under Rule 10b-5. Moreover, even when section 11 ap-
plies to an offering, the plaintiffs will typically also assert concurrent Rule 
10b-5 claims.  
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To prevail on a Rule 10b-5 action, the plaintiff must prove 
that a fraudulent misstatement was made with scienter, or 
fraudulent intent.40 At the pleading stage, this scienter must be 
pleaded with sufficient specificity so the court can conclude 
that there is a strong inference of fraud.41 The plaintiff must al-
so establish other elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action such 
as materiality (the importance of the misstatement to a rea-
sonable investor), and causation (whether the investor suffered 
a loss because of the misstatement).42 
In contrast to section 11 suits, bondholders will usually 
find it more difficult to bring Rule 10b-5 suits than sharehold-
ers. As a general matter, even though they involve investments 
with a greater aggregate value than stock markets,43 bond 
markets tend to be less liquid and efficient. While bonds of 
large issuers trade frequently,44 most bonds do not trade as of-
ten as stocks, trade over-the-counter rather than on exchanges, 
and are not followed as closely by research analysts.45 As a re-
 
 40. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976). 
 41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). 
 42. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) 
(listing elements of 10b-5 claim). 
 43. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 632 
(N.D. Ala. 2009) (“The size of the bond market also dwarfs the stock markets; 
roughly $880 billion in bonds trade a day, as compared with $85.5 billion in 
stocks.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Gordon J. Alexander et al., The Determinants of Trading 
Volume of High-Yield Corporate Bonds, 3 J. FIN. MARKETS 177, 179 (2000) 
(“[O]ur sample of bonds exceeded the anecdotal benchmark and . . . their dol-
lar volume is comparable to the medium to high volume NYSE and Nasdaq 
stocks. This volume suggests that these bonds are not simply held to maturity, 
but that some portion of the public float is traded actively.”). There is evidence 
that bond markets can be informationally efficient. See Edith S. Hotchkiss & 
Tavy Ronen, The Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market: An 
Intraday Analysis, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1325, 1328 (2002) (finding in study of 
fifty-five corporate bonds “that information is impounded quickly into both 
bond and stock prices, despite the lesser transparency for the bonds”). 
 45.  See, e.g., Amy K. Edwards et al., Corporate Bond Market Transaction 
Costs and Transparency, 62 J. FIN. 1421, 1427 (2007) (finding that corporate 
bonds on average only trade 2.4 times per day); Michael A. Goldstein et al., 
Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate Bonds, 20 
REV. FIN. STUD. 235, 235 (2007) (“[T]he corporate bond market historically has 
been one of the least transparent securities markets in the United States, with 
neither pretrade nor posttrade transparency. Corporate bonds trade primarily 
over-the-counter, and until recently, no centralized mechanism existed to col-
lect and disseminate posttransaction information.”); Sriketan Mahanti et al., 
Latent Liquidity: A New Measure of Liquidity, with an Application to Corpo-
rate Bonds, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 272, 278 (2008) (finding that very few bonds trade 
every day and over 40% of corporate bonds do not trade even once a year); 
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sult, it is less common for a bond to trade in an efficient market 
than a stock.46  
In cases where a security trades in an efficient market, 
courts presume that investors uniformly relied upon the integ-
rity of the market in purchasing the security.47 This fraud-on-
the-market presumption provides the commonality necessary to 
certify a class action. If a bond market is not efficient, that pre-
sumption will not apply and bondholders will not be able to 
proceed as a class.48 Indeed, as will be discussed later in this 
Article, certification of a bond class has been denied in one ma-
jor case,49 though in many cases courts have found that bonds 
do trade in efficient markets.50 
 
Paul Schultz, Corporate Bond Trading Costs: A Peek Behind the Curtain, 56 J. 
FIN. 677, 678 (2001) (“Most bonds trade infrequently.”).  
Some factors that influence the amount of trades include the size of the is-
sue and age of the bond. See, e.g., Edwards et al., supra, at 1431 (“[C]orporate 
bonds take about 2 years to settle into institutional portfolios, after which 
point the secondary market is thinner but still alive.”); Goldstein et al., supra, 
at 249 (finding that bonds from larger issues trade more frequently and that 
bonds trade less frequently as they age).  
 46. Indeed, there may not even be market prices for illiquid bonds. See 
Oded Sarig & Arthur Warga, Bond Price Data and Bond Market Liquidity, 24 
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 367, 369 (1989) (“For illiquid bonds, which 
do not trade as often as other bonds, month-end actual trade prices need not 
exist. In these cases, traders have to guess the price that would have cleared 
an active market, had one existed.”). 
 47. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1988) (“[W]here ma-
terially misleading statements have been disseminated into an impersonal, 
well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on 
the integrity of the market may be presumed.”).  
 48. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 328. 
 49. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (finding that plaintiffs failed to show that AIG bonds “traded in an effi-
cient market”), vacated and remanded by 689 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 50. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 639 
(N.D. Ala. 2009) (“[T]he HealthSouth bond market traded on all the publicly 
available information and thus meets the test for informational efficiency.”); 
In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 207–08 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, 639 
F.3d 623 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he weight of the various factors discussed above 
leads us to conclude that DVI’s Senior Notes traded in an efficient market dur-
ing the Class Period.”); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec. Deriv. & 
“ERISA” Litig.), 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 768 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“The Court finds 
that [plaintiff’s expert] has made a prima facie showing that Enron’s Regis-
tered Bonds and Preferred Securities did trade in an efficient secondary mar-
ket.”). 
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B. TWO HYPOTHESES RELATING TO BONDHOLDER CLASS 
ACTIONS 
This Section presents two hypotheses to frame the empiri-
cal analysis of bondholder class actions. The first sets forth rea-
sons why bondholder involvement in securities class actions 
may be insignificant. The second sets forth the opposite view, 
that bondholder involvement is significant. 
1. Hypothesis 1: The Insignificance of Bondholder Class 
Actions 
Bondholder class actions may seem to be of little im-
portance because bondholder losses from fraud are smaller and 
less frequent than shareholder losses. If bondholders simply 
make the same arguments as shareholders, their presence adds 
little to the litigation. Bondholder recoveries might only reflect 
rent-seeking by opportunistic class action attorneys.  
a. Less Frequent and Smaller Losses 
As noted earlier, bondholders are shielded from most secu-
rities frauds.51 It is only when a fraud threatens the firm’s sol-
vency that bondholders will be affected. Shareholders will suf-
fer losses from securities fraud more frequently than 
bondholders and those losses will be much larger than bond-
holder losses. To the extent that compensation is a goal of secu-
rities class actions, shareholders will recover more than bond-
holders. To the extent that deterrence is a goal of securities 
class actions, the bulk of the deterrent effect will be generated 
by shareholder recoveries.  
b. Similar Interests as Shareholders 
Given that bondholders suffer smaller losses than share-
holders, one might argue that shareholders will adequately 
represent bondholder interests in any securities class action. In 
some situations bondholder and shareholder interests are 
aligned.52 Many securities frauds will harm investors in similar 
 
 51. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 237, 273 (2009) (“Public debt offerings provide a lower chance 
of liability and smaller potential damages because debt is paid back first in 
preference to distributions to equity.”).  
 52. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor 
Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1773, 1777–78 (2013) (“[I]t is important not to 
forget that shareholder and creditor interests are broadly aligned with respect 
to a wide set of decisions; both shareholders and creditors want the company 
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ways. A misstatement that hides a sharp decline in earnings 
will distort both the shareholder’s prediction of future earnings 
and the bondholder’s assessment of the credit risk associated 
with the company. All investors have an interest in minimizing 
fraud, and it may not be clear why bondholders have distinct 
interests in a securities class action. If bondholders are affected 
by fraud in similar ways as shareholders, they would make 
identical arguments as shareholders in litigating a securities 
class action.  
c. Opportunistic Recoveries 
In light of the infrequency and redundancy arguments, 
when bondholders receive part of a securities fraud recovery, 
such recovery might be written off as opportunistic. As noted 
earlier, bondholders are more likely to have access to the leni-
ent liability standard of section 11, which does not require proof 
of fraudulent intent, because they find it easier to meet the 
tracing requirement.53 To the extent that a bond offering hap-
pens to coincide with a fraudulent misstatement, bondholders 
will have a strong case for recovery. Indeed, the issuer will of-
ten have little defense so long as there is a material misrepre-
sentation in its SEC filings. Because bond offerings are rela-
tively frequent, the offering may have nothing to do with any 
fraudulent scheme, but will subject the issuer to a heightened 
liability standard. A section 11 recovery by a bondholder may 
reflect nothing more than being in the right place at the right 
time. 
Class action attorneys have incentives to represent bond-
holders to siphon off part of the settlement obtained by share-
holders. Bondholder recoveries could reflect nothing more than 
aggressive attempts to carve out a role in a securities class ac-
tion. For example, in the WorldCom case, some bondholders 
were recruited to opt out of a settlement by an attorney who 
 
to be well run and profitable.”); William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Rela-
tionships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 113 
(1989) (“The investment conception emphasizes the shared characteristics of 
debt and equity – debt and equity investments differ only in degree; they are 
not fundamentally different forms of participation.”). For financial economists, 
shareholders and bondholders are simply different sources of funding for the 
corporation who have rights to the corporation’s cash flows. See Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 
737, 737 (1997) (defining corporate governance as measures that ensure inves-
tors receive a return on their investment). 
 53. See supra Part II.A.1.  
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failed in his attempt to be appointed lead counsel.54 Bondholder 
recoveries might simply reflect a struggle over rents generated 
by the class action settlement process.  
2. Hypothesis 2: The Significance of Bondholder Class Actions 
Though bondholders suffer smaller and less frequent losses 
from fraud, they tend to recover in cases involving the most 
significant frauds. Moreover, bondholders do not always have 
identical interests as shareholders. Securities fraud can trans-
fer wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Bondholders thus 
can make unique arguments about a fraud that would not be 
raised by shareholders. 
a. The Most Important Frauds 
Bondholders will be involved in a smaller percentage of 
class actions, but bondholder class actions often target frauds 
with the greatest societal impact. Some of these frauds will in-
volve bankruptcies of large public companies.55 To the extent 
that a securities class action targets a temporary fluctuation in 
the stock price, it will be difficult for bondholders to claim inju-
ry. Thus, bondholder recoveries are less likely to reflect nui-
sance settlements of strike suits against healthy companies.  
b. Divergence of Bondholder and Shareholder Interests 
Even though bondholders may recover relatively small 
amounts in many cases, if bondholder interests differ from 
shareholder interests with respect to certain securities frauds, 
their recoveries will not just be redundant and opportunistic. 
Rather, bondholder plaintiffs can add a perspective to a securi-
ties class action that is not present when there are only share-
holder plaintiffs. Indeed, in certain circumstances, securities 
 
 54. Coffee, supra note 7, at 311.  
 55. See James J. Park, Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 547 (2013). When bondholders suffer losses in a bankruptcy 
associated with a securities fraud, they can recover some of their losses by 
bringing a securities class action. Though the issuer usually cannot contribute 
to any recovery for securities fraud, insurance policies that cover the liability 
of directors and officers for securities fraud are typically not subject to the 
bankruptcy stay and are often a source of recovery. See, e.g., Gillman v. Cont’l 
Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 216–17 (3d Cir. 2000); La. World 
Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, Inc.), 832 F.2d 
1391, 1400–01 (5th Cir. 1987). Moreover, third parties such as underwriters 
and auditors who are not subject to the bankruptcy stay are also potential 
sources of damages. 
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fraud can be motivated by a desire to further the interests of 
shareholders at the expense of bondholders.  
The interests of shareholders and bondholders can diverge 
with respect to fraud because shareholders generally prefer 
that the corporation take on more risk than do bondholders. 
Shareholders get the upside from risky projects that can in-
crease the value of the corporation but only have limited liabil-
ity for the corporation’s debts.56 Shareholders are thus often 
said to have a call option on the corporation’s assets that pays 
off when the assets are greater than the liabilities.57 In con-
trast, bondholders who receive a fixed rate of return share in 
none of the upside of a risky project, but can suffer losses if the 
project fails. Bondholders thus prefer that the corporation avoid 
excessive risk, while shareholders want the company to take on 
risk to grow its earnings.58 
In light of these different risk preferences, there are two 
contexts relating to bondholder class actions where bondholder 
and shareholder interests can conflict. When fraud relates to a 
bond offering, the fraud is a way of directly extracting value 
from bondholders to shareholders. Fraud relating to secondary 
markets can reflect risk-taking that benefits shareholders 
without benefiting bondholders.  
 i. Bond Offering Fraud 
When a company sells bonds to the public, securities law 
requires it to make disclosures to investors who rely upon those 
representations in purchasing the bond.59 To the extent that 
such statements are false, the fraud can enable the company to 
borrow funds at more favorable terms than without the fraud.60 
 
 56. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The 
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 66 (1986) (“As the residual 
claimant, the shareholders receive all the upside return, but, because they 
have limited liability, they can avoid downside loss, except to the extent their 
capital is invested in the firm.”). 
 57. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Cor-
porate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 649–50 (1973) (“In effect, the bond 
holders own the company’s assets, but they have given options to the stock-
holders to buy the assets back.”).  
 58. See, e.g., Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolven-
cy: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1491 
(1993) (“Unlike shareholders, creditors prefer management to risk as little as 
possible because they have little to gain if risky ventures succeed and will suf-
fer further loss should these projects fail.”). 
 59. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2012). 
 60. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 
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The expected gains from any projects made possible with these 
funds will primarily benefit shareholders. 
Professors Michael Jensen and William Meckling observed 
in their seminal article on agency costs in public corporations 
that when a company has two projects with differing risks, 
management can benefit shareholders at the expense of bond-
holders by promising to take on the low-risk project, selling 
bonds at a price that assumes the company will take on the 
low-risk project, and taking on the high-risk project instead.61 
The fraud enables shareholders to take value from the bond-
holders because: (1) if the company had revealed that it would 
take on the riskier project, the bondholder would have charged 
a higher interest rate to take into account the additional risk of 
default (interest savings translate into higher earnings that 
benefit shareholders); and (2) if the riskier project has a higher 
expected value than the low-risk project, taking on the high-
risk project would increase the company’s stock price. Fraud 
hiding the risk of a project thus benefits risk-preferring share-
holders at the expense of risk-averse bondholders. 
 Jensen and Meckling’s point can be generalized to misrep-
resentations relating to the credit risk of a firm. If a company’s 
risk of default is 50% and its public disclosures wrongly convey 
that the risk is 0%, a bondholder who buys bonds assuming 
that the risk is 0% will charge a lower price than if he knew 
that the risk was 50%. If the bondholder knew the truth, the 
price of the bond would be discounted by taking into account 
the risk of default along with the bondholder’s expected recov-
ery in bankruptcy. Thus, if the bondholder expects to recover 
50% of his investment in bankruptcy, revelation that the true 
default risk is 50% would result in a discounting of the value of 
the bond by 25%.62 A bond with a face value of $100 would thus 
 
479, 503 (2001) (“If the shareholder in some way deceived the creditor into be-
lieving that the corporation had adequate assets to cover its obligations and 
the creditor, relying on that misstatement, failed to demand a personal guar-
antee, the shareholder ought to end up being held liable.”).  
 61. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305, 335 (1976); see also Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured 
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1149 (1979) 
(“Because the interest rate is fixed, the debtor has an incentive to increase the 
riskiness of the loan, since, by doing so, he effectively obtains a higher-risk 
loan at an interest rate reflecting the lower risk level anticipated by the credi-
tor when the loan was made.”). 
 62. The risk of default (0.5) times the expected recovery in bankruptcy 
(0.5) would equal 0.25. 
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really be worth $75. The bondholder’s damage from the fraud, 
$25, is the amount extracted from the bondholders by the 
shareholders, who were essentially able to sell a $75 bond to 
investors for $100.  
To concretely illustrate how securities fraud can benefit 
shareholders at the expense of bondholders, consider the case of 
WorldCom. WorldCom operated in the highly competitive tele-
communications industry where high capital expenditures were 
necessary.63 As industry conditions declined, WorldCom needed 
additional funds to continue its operations.64 In a series of two 
public bond offerings, WorldCom raised $16.8 billion by selling 
bonds that paid about an 8% interest rate.65 The registration 
statements for those offerings incorporated statements from 
periodic disclosures that inflated the company’s earnings by 
understating its expenses.66 In doing so, WorldCom created the 
impression it was “successfully managing industry trends that 
were hurting all of its competitors.”67  
If the truth had been known, WorldCom would not have 
been able to issue bonds without paying higher rates, and per-
haps would not have been successful at raising billions of dol-
lars to fund its operations. If WorldCom had succeeded in using 
the funds to turn around the company, the shareholders would 
have benefited much more than the bondholders who receive a 
fixed return. In fact, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy and 
WorldCom bondholders saw their investment fall from a high of 
$106 in the secondary market to $11.68 The bond offerings al-
lowed WorldCom to raise funds to benefit shareholders at the 
expense of bondholders.  
 
 63. See DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
WORLDCOM, INC. 44 (2003).  
 64. WorldCom had previously funded its daily operations through short-
term commercial paper, but found at some point it was not able to raise addi-
tional funds through that market. First Amended Complaint ¶ 197, In re 
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter WorldCom Compl.].  
 65. Id. ¶¶ 199, 218, 220.  
 66. Id. ¶¶ 206, 230. 
 67. BERESFORD ET AL., supra note 63, at 13.  
 68. WorldCom Compl., supra note 64, ¶ 6. One named plaintiff alleged 
losses of over $28 million. Id. ¶ 30.  
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 ii. Secondary Market Fraud 
Securities fraud can also harm bondholders by inflating the 
price they pay for bonds in the secondary market. Such fraud 
typically inflates the price all investors, shareholders and 
bondholders, pay for securities. In some circumstances, second-
ary market fraud can benefit shareholders at the expense of 
bondholders. For example, when a company takes on additional 
risk but hides it to maintain its credit rating, the fraud can be 
understood as a transfer from bondholders to shareholders.  
Consider a case where a company wants to borrow money 
to invest in a risky project but doing so will endanger its credit 
rating. Also assume that a lower credit rating would materially 
reduce its ability to conduct its business. The company commits 
accounting fraud, characterizing what are in substance loans as 
asset sales. By doing so, the company essentially borrows addi-
tional funds without affecting its credit rating.  
The fraud would benefit shareholders more than bondhold-
ers. If the risky project succeeds, shareholders will capture the 
gains. If the risky project fails, both shareholders and bond-
holders would suffer losses. So long as the expected gain from 
the fraud is greater than the expected losses, shareholders 
would seek to go forward with the fraud.69 Bondholders, in con-
trast, do not have expected gains to weigh against expected 
losses and would prefer the company not take on the risky 
course of conduct. Without the fraud, the company would not be 
able to take on additional debt, would not be able to take on the 
risky project, and bondholders would be safe.  
The fraud is essentially a transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders. Bondholders who purchase bonds on the second-
ary market relying on the company’s credit rating have pur-
chased bonds that are worth less than the market price because 
 
 69. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay 
on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 243, 290–91 (noting that the innocence of shareholders “dimin-
ishes further if one treats the class of shareholders as the primary, if not the 
sole, beneficiaries of managerial profit maximizing, the sole class of actors le-
gally empowered to determine the composition of corporate boards and, 
through them, the sole class of actors that can select the management of the 
most powerful private actors in our society”); James C. Spindler, Vicarious Li-
ability for Bad Corporate Governance: Are We Wrong About 10b-5?, 13 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 359, 378 (2011) (“[S]hareholders are no different from the seller 
in any sort of commercial transaction, who prefers a higher price to a lower 
one. Given a manager who maximizes aggregate shareholder payoffs, firms 
will tend to commit fraud.”). 
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of the added risk assumed with the help of the fraud.70 The 
shareholders reap the gains of the fraud because the company 
can conduct business with a higher credit rating while taking 
on greater risk than reflected by that rating.  
Enron is an example of a company that defrauded bond-
holders to take on risks for shareholders. Enron was an energy 
trader that relied upon its credit rating to do business.71 With-
out a strong credit rating, it could not trade without posting 
significant collateral.72 At the same time, Enron was aggres-
sively investing in new businesses to increase its stock price, 
and needed funds to make such investments. If it sold addi-
 
 70. Securities fraud relating to secondary markets tends to directly bene-
fit selling investors. For example, suppose an issuer discloses information that 
indicates there is a 0% chance of insolvency when in fact there is a 50% chance 
of insolvency. The stock trades at $100 a share based on this false disclosure 
and would trade at $50 if the truth were known. Because there is a 50% 
chance the stock is worth $0, the market might discount a $100 stock price by 
50%. The secondary market fraud thus inflates the stock by $50 a share. A 
shareholder who sells at $100 a share captures a gain from the fraud of $50 a 
share, while the shareholder who purchases at $100 a share will suffer a loss 
of $50 a share. 
Selling bondholders can also capture gains from securities fraud, but their 
gains tend to be less than selling shareholders. Bond prices fluctuate less than 
stock prices because bondholders can expect some recovery even in insolvency. 
Consider how bonds might react to the example above where the disclosed risk 
of insolvency is 0% while the true risk of insolvency is 50%. A bond would 
trade at its par value (assume that is $100) when the risk of insolvency is 0%. 
Unlike the stock, the bond price would not be discounted fully by 50% if the 
true risk of insolvency were known. The market would take into account the 
fact that bondholders would recover some of their investment even in insol-
vency. Suppose bondholders could expect to recover 50% of their investment in 
bankruptcy. A 50% chance of a 50% recovery would mean that the market 
would discount the bond price by 25%, meaning the bond’s price absent the 
fraud would be $75. A bondholder who sells at the inflated price of $100 would 
capture a $25 gain, while the bondholder who purchases at the inflated price 
would suffer a loss of $25 a bond when the true risk of insolvency is revealed.  
In the example just described, selling shareholders benefit from secondary 
market fraud by $50 a share (or 50% of their investment) while bondholders 
benefit by $25 a bond (or 25% of their investment). Selling bondholders benefit 
from secondary fraud just as selling shareholders do, though we can expect 
that selling shareholders have a greater incentive to push issuers to commit 
secondary market fraud because they gain more from such fraud. 
 71. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF THE INVESTIGA-
TION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
OF ENRON CORP. 36 (2002) (“Maintaining Enron’s credit rating at investment 
grade was vital to the conduct of its energy trading business.”).  
 72. See Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner 
at 18–19, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003). 
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tional debt, Enron’s credit rating might have fallen.73 Instead, 
Enron entered into transactions it characterized as sales with 
various special purpose entities it controlled. In fact, the sales 
were loans because Enron was ultimately responsible for the 
liabilities of the special purpose entities.74 These transactions 
allowed Enron to raise funds without putting additional debt 
on its balance sheet. If the truth were known, Enron’s debt 
would have been $22.1 billion rather than the reported $10.2 
billion.75 Enron’s credit rating would have plummeted, prevent-
ing it from taking on risky projects for its shareholders. Enron’s 
bondholders were harmed because they paid prices for debt on 
the secondary market that did not reflect the additional risk 
that Enron had taken on.  
III.  EVIDENCE OF BONDHOLDER RECOVERIES   
This Part builds upon the earlier theoretical discussion and 
presents empirical evidence relating to bondholder involvement 
in securities class actions. Based on examination of a data set 
of 1660 securities class actions filed from 1996 through 2005,76 
this study finds that bondholders are part of an increasing 
number of cases. As predicted by the significance hypothesis, 
bondholders recover in the largest settlements and often assert 
distinct claims of harm from shareholders. On the other hand, 
as predicted by the insignificance hypothesis, bondholder re-
 
 73. See, e.g., id. at 15 (noting that Enron “was reluctant to incur debt be-
cause of a possible adverse effect on its credit ratings”); John R. Kroger, En-
ron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 76 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 57, 68 (2005) (“Enron needed to raise billions of dollars to meet 
its costs, but it needed to do so in a manner that would not spook capital mar-
kets and jeopardize its trading business.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 72, at 37–
38 (“Although it treated these transactions as sales for accounting purposes, 
Enron (i) had the obligation to repay substantially all of the financing regard-
less of the value of the underlying assets and (ii) retained substantially all of 
the future appreciation in value and cash flows from the underlying asset.”). 
 75. See id. at 3.  
 76. Part of this data set was collected for a prior study. See Park, supra 
note 55. The data set was compiled primarily using documents posted on the 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and was supplemented with 
data from PACER, the LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, Westlaw, 
Lexis, and internet sources. The data set only includes cases where the prima-
ry allegation is that the issuer or its agents inflated the issuer’s stock price 
through fraud. It thus excludes cases that involve allegations of fraud relating 
to IPO allocations, investment adviser fraud, mutual fund market timing, and 
proxy fraud. 
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coveries tend to be relatively small compared to shareholder re-
coveries.  
Initially, the study sought to identify all complaints with 
bondholder plaintiffs. A problem with this approach was that in 
many cases, it was difficult to identify ex ante whether bond-
holders were part of the class. Bondholders were specifically 
identified as plaintiffs in the complaint in only a small number 
of cases. One prior study found only 24 securities class action 
cases filed from 1996 to 2008, a period three years longer than 
the data set for this study, where bondholders were named as 
plaintiffs.77 However, counting only cases where bondholders 
are explicitly named as plaintiffs underestimates the number of 
bondholder plaintiffs because some classes are defined in a way 
that could include bondholders though specific bondholders are 
not named as plaintiffs.  
The most accurate way of measuring bondholder involve-
ment in securities class actions was to search for bondholder 
recoveries. Bondholders indisputably take part in cases where 
they receive part of a recovery.78 Bondholder recoveries can be 
identified by looking at the notice of settlement filed with the 
court after the parties agree to settle a case. Such notices speci-
fy when a bondholder was allocated a portion of the settlement. 
This study found many more cases where bondholders recov-
ered than cases where bondholders were named as plaintiffs. 
Table 1 summarizes the number of bondholder recoveries 
by filing year.79 Of the 1660 securities class actions in the data 
set, 1152 settled for some amount. Of those 1152 settled cases, 
64 involved a bondholder recovery, a substantially higher num-
ber than cases where bondholders were specifically named as 
plaintiffs.80 Bondholder recoveries were rare for cases filed from 
 
 77. See Billings et al., supra note 2, at 45. 
 78. On the other hand, this method would not include cases where bond-
holders are named as plaintiffs but bondholders do not recover because the 
case is unsuccessful. 
 79. In other words, a bondholder recovery in 2003 means that the original 
securities class action was filed in 2003, not that the case settled in 2003.  
 80. This figure is a conservative one. The total of 64 bondholder recoveries 
does not include cases where bondholders were plaintiffs and the case did not 
result in a recovery. Moreover, in the data set, there were about 15 to 20 cases 
where convertible bondholders received a recovery but investors in noncon-
vertible bonds did not. These cases were not classified as bondholder recover-
ies. While they are technically bonds, the interests of convertible bondholders 
are more closely aligned with shareholders than the interests of the typical 
bondholder. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival 
of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 
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1996 through 2000, averaging about 3% of the 542 securities 
class that were settled. The period from 2001 through 2005 saw 
a significant increase in bondholder recoveries, averaging 8% of 
the 610 securities class actions that were settled.81  
 
Table 1. Summary Data on Number of Bondholder 
Recoveries in Data Set by Year (1996-2005). 
 
Year 
Number of 
Securities 
Class Action 
Settlements 
Number of 
Bondholder 
Recoveries 
% of Securities 
Class Action 
Settlements 
with 
Bondholder 
Recoveries 
1996 63 2 3.2 
1997 105 2 1.9 
1998 139 3 2.1 
1999 113 4 3.5 
2000 122 5 4.1 
1996-2000 542 16 3.0 
2001 117 10 8.5 
2002 129 15 11.6 
2003 106 8 7.5 
2004 127 8 6.2 
2005 131 7 5.3 
2001-2005 610 48 7.9 
  
 
Supporting the significance hypothesis, bondholder recov-
eries are present in the majority of the largest settlements of 
securities class actions. Table 2 lists the 30 largest securities 
class action settlements in the data set (the “Top 30 Settle-
ments”) and identifies whether they involve a bondholder re-
covery. Four of the top 5 settlements had bondholder recover-
ies. Seven of the top 10 and 19 of the top 30 settlements also 
resulted in bondholder recoveries. This article will refer to the-
 
COLUM. L. REV. 261, 313 (1981) (noting with respect to convertible bonds: “the 
principal value of such a security will come from its convertibility into equi-
ty”).  
 81. This difference is statistically significant at p<0.01.  
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se 19 bondholder settlements as the “Largest Bondholder Set-
tlements.”82  
 
Table 2. Top 30 Settlements by Size (1996-2005) 
(Bondholder Recoveries in Bold). 
 
Issuer 
Name 
Filing 
Year 
Approxi-
mate Total 
Settlement 
Amount
Bondholder 
Recovery 
Credit 
Down
grade 
Bank-
ruptcy 
Filing 
Enron 
Corp. 
2001 $7.2 billion Yes Yes Yes 
WorldCom, 
Inc. 
2002 $6.2 billion Yes Yes Yes 
Tyco In-
ternationa
l Ltd. 
2002 $3.2 billion Yes Yes No 
Cendant 
Corp. 
1998 $3.2 billion Yes No No 
AOL Time 
Warner, 
Inc. 
2002 $2.7 billion Yes No No 
Nortel Net-
works Corp. 
2001 $2.5 billion No No No 
Royal Ahold 
Corp. 
2003 $1.1 billion No Yes No 
American 
Interna-
tional 
Group Inc. 
2004 $1 billion Yes Yes No 
McKesson 
HBOC, 
Inc. 
1999 $1 billion Yes No No 
 
 82. It is unclear whether there is any causal relationship between bond-
holder recoveries and the size of securities class action settlements. Bondhold-
er recoveries may occur because large settlements are more likely to involve 
large companies whose bonds trade in liquid markets. On the other hand, per-
haps the possibility of a bondholder recovery leads to higher recoveries to take 
into account the fact that the class of recovering plaintiffs is larger. When a 
section 11 claim is asserted by a bondholder, there may be pressure to pay 
substantial amounts to cover what is likely to be a claim with a lower thresh-
old of proof. Resolving whether there is a causal link between bondholder re-
coveries and the size of securities class actions is a question to be left for an-
other time.  
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Health-
South 
Corp. 
1998 $778 mil-
lion 
Yes Yes No 
Xerox 
Corp. 
2000 $750 mil-
lion
Yes Yes No 
Cardinal 
Health, Inc. 
2004 $600 million No Yes No 
Lucent 
Technolo-
gies, Inc. 
2000 $568 mil-
lion 
Yes Yes No 
BankAmer-
ica Corp. 
1998 $490 million No No No 
Dynegy, 
Inc. 
2002 $468 million No Yes No 
Raytheon 
Company 
1999 $460 million No No No 
Adelphia 
Communi-
cations 
Corp. 
2002 $460 mil-
lion 
Yes Yes Yes 
Waste 
Manage-
ment, Inc. 
1999 $457 mil-
lion 
Yes Yes No 
Qwest 
Communi-
cations In-
ternationa
l Inc. 
2001 $451 mil-
lion 
Yes No Yes 
Federal 
Home Loan 
Mortgage 
Corp. 
2003 $410 million No No No 
Marsh & 
McLennan 
Compa-
nies, Inc. 
2004 $400 mil-
lion 
Yes Yes No 
Global 
Crossing, 
Ltd. 
2002 $343 mil-
lion 
Yes No Yes 
Rite Aid 
Corp. 
1999 $334 mil-
lion
Yes Yes No 
Delphi 
Corp. 
2005 $333 mil-
lion
Yes Yes Yes 
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Sunbeam 
Corp. 
1998 $330 million No No Yes 
Williams 
Compa-
nies, Inc. 
2002 $311 mil-
lion 
Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Motors 
Corp. 
2005 $303 mil-
lion 
Yes Yes No 
Oxford 
Health 
Plans, Inc. 
1997 $300 million No No No 
Bristol-
Myers 
Squibb Co. 
2002 $300 million No No No 
El Paso 
Corp. 
2002 $285 mil-
lion
Yes Yes No 
 
For the largest settlements, bondholder recoveries are pri-
marily driven by credit downgrades, where a rating agency 
concludes that the issuer is at greater risk of defaulting on its 
debt. For the Top 30 settlements, the presence of a credit 
downgrade was associated with a bondholder recovery. Fifteen 
of the 19 Largest Bondholder Settlements (79%) involved a 
credit downgrade.83 Only 3 of the 11 cases (27%) where bond-
holders did not recover involved a credit downgrade. This dif-
ference was statistically significant at the 1% level.84 In 6 of the 
19 Largest Bondholder Settlements (32%), the issuer filed for 
bankruptcy while the securities class action was pending.85 On-
ly 1 of the 11 cases (9%) without bondholder recoveries involved 
a bankruptcy filing. However, this difference was not statisti-
cally significant.86 In all but 2 of the 19 Largest Bondholder 
Settlements, there was either a credit downgrade or bankrupt-
cy.  
Consistent with the hypothesis that bondholders assert 
distinct arguments, many of the complaints associated with the 
 
 83. For the sample of bondholder recoveries as a whole, about half of the 
cases with bondholder recoveries involved a credit downgrade. See infra Ap-
pendix, Table A2. 
 84. p=0.0086. 
 85. For the sample of bondholder recoveries as a whole, about half of the 
cases with bondholder recoveries involved a bankrupt company. See infra Ap-
pendix, Table A2. 
 86. p=0.2146. 
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19 Largest Bondholder Settlements make allegations con-
sistent with conduct that would benefit shareholders at the ex-
pense of bondholders. The HealthSouth complaint alleged that 
fraudulent bond offerings were used to raise fresh capital to 
keep HealthSouth afloat.87 The complaint in General Motors al-
leged that the company saved $520 million in interest costs by 
fraudulently issuing bonds.88 The Adelphia, Delphi, and Wil-
liams Companies complaints all alleged that the fraud hid debt 
from the markets.89 
The data set is consistent with the hypothesis that bond-
holders are often in a position to assert section 11 claims. 
Bondholders brought section 11 claims in a substantial per-
centage of cases where they received part of a recovery. Of the 
19 Largest Bondholder Settlements, as shown in Table A1 of 
the Appendix, 13 (68%) involved section 11 claims arising out of 
a bond offering. Additionally, Table A2 of the Appendix shows 
that 46.9% of all bondholder recoveries in the data set involved 
a section 11 claim. Thus, many, but not all, bondholder recover-
ies were in cases where bond offerings coincide with an alleged 
fraud. 
In terms of the size of bondholder recoveries, as predicted 
by the insignificance hypothesis, bondholders usually recover 
smaller amounts than shareholders, though many of the recov-
eries are quantitatively large. Determining the amount of actu-
al recoveries was challenging because it is not always clear 
from the notice of settlement how much bondholders actually 
recover.90 While an average recovery per share is almost always 
calculated for shareholder recoveries, that is not the case for 
bondholder recoveries. For example, the notice of settlement in 
 
 87. See Joint Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint for 
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws [Factual Basis] ¶¶ 12–15, In re 
HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-03-BE-1500-S (N.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2004).  
 88. Third Amended Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities 
Laws ¶ 590, In re General Motors Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 06-md-1749 (E.D. 
Mich. Aug. 15, 2006).  
 89. See Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 42–53, In re Delphi Corp. 
Sec. Litig., No. 1:05-CV-2637 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005); Consolidated 
Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, In re Adelphia Comm. Corp. Sec. & Deriv. Litig., 
No. 03-MD-1529 (LMM) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003); Consolidated Amended 
Complaint ¶¶ 15, 16, 227, In re Williams Sec. Litig., No. 02-CV-72-H(M) (N.D. 
Okla. Oct. 7, 2002). 
 90. Moreover, information about actual settlement distributions is often 
confidential. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the 
PSLRA After a Decade, or “Look What’s Happened to My Baby,” 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 543, 576 (2008) (reporting that settlement administrators would not dis-
close information about distributions).  
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a securities class action against Xerox stated: “There were ap-
proximately thirty-six different individual issues of Xerox 
bonds outstanding during the Class Period, each of which is 
subject to differing potential loss amounts . . . estimating an 
average recovery per bond is not meaningful.”91 However, in 
some cases, it is possible to identify how much of the settlement 
was allocated to bondholders.  
In section 11 cases, it was easiest to determine the amount 
recovered by bondholders. Of the 19 Largest Bondholder Set-
tlements, there were 6 cases where the size of the section 11 re-
covery was specified:   
  In the WorldCom class action, bondholders recovered $5 billion,92 
an average recovery of about $400 per $1000 bond.93 
  In the Tyco class action, bondholders recovered 8% of a $3.2 billion 
settlement, or about $250 million.94  
  In the HealthSouth class action, about $230 million,95 or $64 per 
$1000 bond, was allocated to bondholders.96  
  In the Delphi class action, up to 18% of a $300 million settlement 
was allocated to Delphi bondholders, a total of about $54 million.97  
  In the American International Group (AIG) class action, the set-
tlement allocated 5% of the $1 billion recovery to bondholders, a total 
of $50 million.98 
  In the Adelphia class action, the “average recovery for Adelphia 
debt securities” was “$30.52 per [$1000] bond.”99 
As summarized in Table A3 of the Appendix, the amount of 
 
 91. Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement, Motion 
for Attorneys’ Fees and Settlement Fairness Hearing at 2, Carlson v. Xerox 
Corp., No. 3:00-CV-1621 (AWT) (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2008). 
 92. Notice of Proposed Settlements of Class Action with Settling Defend-
ants and Bar Order Notice at 11, In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., Master File 
No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005). 
 93. Id. at 2. 
 94. Notice of Proposed Settlement, Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Fair-
ness Hearing at 1–2, In re Tyco Int’l Sec. Litig., MDL Docket No. 02-1335-PB 
(D.N.H. 2006). 
 95. Notice of Pendency of Class Action at 2, In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. 
Litig., Master File No. CV-03-BE-1500-S (N.D. Ala. Apr. 22, 2010). 
 96. Id. at 5. 
 97. Notice of Proposed Settlement with Certain Defendants, Motion for 
Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement Hearing at 2, In re Delphi Corp. Sec., 
Deriv. & “ERISA” Litig., MDL No. 1725 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 98. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Settlement, Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 
and Expenses Award and Fairness Hearing at 1, In re Am. Int’l Group, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., Master File No. 04 Civ. 8141 (DAB)(AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2011). 
 99. Notice of Pendency and Proposed Partial Settlements of Class Action 
at 2, In re Adelphia Comm. Corp. Sec. and Deriv. Litig., No. 03-MD-1529 
(LMM) (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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the section 11 bondholder recovery was identified for a total of 
22 cases in the data set.100  
In many cases where bondholders recovered for section 11 
claims, a portion of the bondholder recovery also went to bond-
holders asserting fraud relating to trading in secondary mar-
kets. For some cases, this made it difficult to determine how 
the recovery was allocated between section 11 and Rule 10b-5 
claimants. In 2 of the 19 Largest Bondholder Settlements, part 
of the settlement was divided between Rule 10b-5 and section 
11 plaintiffs:  
  In the WorldCom class action, $1 billion “was allocated to pur-
chasers of WorldCom stock and other pre-existing bonds on the open 
market throughout the Class Period.”101 
  In the Enron class action, where the total recovery was $7 billion, 
the court “commingled the settlement funds into a single pool, rather 
than allocating them into different pools with distribution dependent 
on the particular claims (§ 10(b) or § 11) asserted against a particular 
defendant.”102 The bondholders with section 11 claims were entitled to 
recover either the amount of their 10b-5 measure of loss or three 
times their section 11 measure of loss.103  
There were not many identifiable bondholder recoveries in 
cases where only Rule 10b-5 claims were asserted. In 3 of the 
19 Largest Bondholder Settlements, it was possible to identify 
the amount of the secondary market recovery for bondholders: 
  In the Waste Management class action, about $10.2 million of a 
$457 million settlement was allocated to bondholders.104  
  In the Lucent class action, about $3.75 million of a $600 million 
settlement was allocated to bondholders.105 Bondholders also received 
an additional $4.6 million in settlement of related suit alleging com-
mon law claims.106 
 
 100. Among the most significant of these settlements (outside of the 19 
Largest Bondholder Settlements) was the Conseco settlement where bond-
holders recovered $81 million and the Refco settlement where bondholders re-
covered $221.09 per $1,000 bond. 
 101. Notice of Proposed Settlements of Class Action with Settling Defend-
ants and Bar Order Notice, supra note 92. 
 102. Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact, and Order Re Final Approval of 
Plan of Allocation at 13, In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & “ERISA” Litig., MDL-
1446 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2008). 
 103. Id. at 14 n.12. 
 104. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement, Right to Exclusion, and 
Hearing at 1, In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., Master File No. H-99-2183 
(MH) (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 105. Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Settlement, and Hearing Thereon 
at 5, Balaban v. Schacht, Civil Action No. 02-4805 (D.N.J. 2003).  
 106.  Id. at 3. 
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  In the Global Crossing class action, bondholders on average recov-
ered about $13 per $1000 bond. 
As recorded in Table A4 of the Appendix, the amount of a 
Rule 10b-5 settlement was identified for 15 cases in the data 
set.  
The relatively small size of bondholder recoveries in most 
cases provides some support for the insignificance view of 
bondholder class actions. However, smaller settlements do not 
necessarily mean that bondholders recover trivial amounts. 
Since bonds tend to be concentrated in the hands of a smaller 
number of investors than stocks,107 the average recovery for 
each bondholder can be substantial even if the total settlement 
amount is lower.108 Moreover, because bond losses are usually 
smaller than stock losses, even with smaller recoveries, bond-
holders may be compensated for a significant percentage of 
their losses.   
Bondholders are likely to continue recovering in securities 
class actions. The traditional securities class action sought to 
bring claims solely on behalf of shareholders. In the earlier 
years of the data set, plaintiffs rarely purported to bring claims 
on behalf of non-shareholder investors. After 2002, there has 
been a significant shift where complaints seek to represent the 
investors of all publicly traded securities, a broader class that 
includes bondholders. Table 3 presents data on the number of 
class actions with the broader class of all publicly traded secu-
rities. While in 1996 only 7 complaints alleged a class of all 
publicly traded securities, by 2003, close to half of all com-
plaints made such an allegation.  
 
 
 107. See Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in 
Bonds, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 584 (1995). Even in shareholder cases, losses 
tend to be concentrated among the largest investors. See Elliott J. Weiss & 
John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional In-
vestors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 
2053, 2056 (1995). 
 108. Cf. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: 
Do Institutional Investors Fail To File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 
WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 878 (2002) (noting that average recoveries fall as more in-
vestors make claims).  
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Table 3. Summary Data on Number of Cases in Data 
Set where the Class Included Purchasers of “All Publicly 
Traded Securities” (1996-2005). 
 
 
As should be evident from reading Tables 1 and 3 together, 
the number of bondholder recoveries has risen as the number of 
complaints alleging classes of “All Publicly Traded Securities” 
has increased. The emergence of broader certified classes has 
likely been spurred by spectacularly successful bondholder cas-
es such as the class action on behalf of WorldCom investors. 
Moreover, plaintiffs’ attorneys are wary of the possibility that 
bondholders will opt out of the class and retain separate coun-
sel. Class action counsel may respond to this problem by seek-
ing certification of broader classes that include bondholders. At 
the same time, bondholder settlements cannot be solely ex-
plained by the increase in complaints alleging broader classes. 
The severity of recent securities frauds also created the condi-
tions necessary for increasing bondholder recoveries. 
The data set shows that bondholders are increasingly re-
covering through securities class actions and are likely to con-
tinue doing so. As theory would predict, bondholders tend to re-
cover less than shareholders, but recover disproportionately in 
Year 
Number of  
Securities 
Class Actions 
Number of “All 
Publicly  
Traded Securi-
ties” Cases 
% of Securities 
Class Actions 
that were “All 
Publicly Trad-
ed Securities 
Cases 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
84 
139 
198 
173 
184 
156 
188 
164 
187 
187 
7 
13 
16 
24 
36 
45 
55 
80 
104 
75 
8.3 
3.3 
8.0 
13.9 
19.6 
28.8 
29.3 
48.8 
55.6 
40.1 
Total 1660 455 27.4 
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cases with the largest settlements. The presence of a credit 
downgrade appears to be driving bondholder recoveries. 
IV.  BONDHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS AND SECURITIES 
FRAUD   
The rise in bondholder recoveries reflects a change in the 
nature of securities fraud. Section A describes this evolution of 
fraud. In an earlier period, the typical securities fraud involved 
stock price fluctuations that solely affected shareholders. More 
recently, major securities class actions have involved losses so 
substantial that they affect corporate stakeholders such as 
bondholders. Section B then explains how bondholder class ac-
tions are a response to the changing nature of securities fraud. 
The rise in bondholder recoveries demonstrates that securities 
fraud and the class actions targeting such fraud are not static 
in nature. Both securities fraud and securities class actions can 
evolve. 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITIES FRAUD 
Part of the difficulty of defining the concept of securities 
fraud is that such fraud does not have a fixed essence. The 
reach of the prohibition against fraud is deliberately broad and 
captures a wide range of conduct. In some periods, the targeted 
conduct is less egregious in its harm to society than at other 
times. The spike in bondholder recoveries from 2001 through 
2005 is consistent with a significant change in the nature of se-
curities fraud from prior years. 
Early studies of securities class actions focused on emerg-
ing technology companies. For example, Professor Janet Cooper 
Alexander in a seminal 1991 article assessing the merit of se-
curities class actions, looked at a small sample of “initial public 
offerings (“IPOs”) of computer and computer-related companies 
during the first half of 1983.”109 The concern with such offerings 
is that the promoter of the company might overstate the pro-
spects of the company to investors.110 On the other hand, invest-
ing in emerging start-up companies is generally risky, and in-
vestors should be well-aware of those risks. Complaints of 
deception by investors in fledgling companies may seem like 
 
 109. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements 
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 507 (1991).  
 110. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Prob-
lems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1057–59 (1995). 
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self-serving attempts to recover losses from a speculative in-
vestment. 
Another early type of securities fraud case targeted the 
failure of a company to meet earnings projections. The stock 
market can relentlessly focus on the immediate concern of 
whether a company has met its numbers for the quarter. When 
a company fails to meet its projections, the stock price can 
plummet, and some investors might complain that those projec-
tions were made with knowledge that they were false.111 The 
problem with this argument is that projections are inherently 
speculative, and the failure to meet a projection often reflects 
nothing more than the difficulty of predicting the future. If in-
correct projections routinely trigger a securities class action, 
companies will simply stop making such projections, cutting off 
information that could be useful to investors. Congress thus ex-
empted projections from securities fraud liability in the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).112 
After the passage of the PSLRA, attention shifted to ques-
tionable accounting with respect to earnings. Under scrutiny by 
the SEC,113 dozens of companies admitted to false accounting 
and restated their earnings.114 Misstatements of earnings can 
lead to significant mistakes by investors who rely on accounting 
statements in valuing securities. At least initially, such earn-
ings restatements were relatively minor, and would not have 
affected bondholders.  
Later, major earnings misstatements were associated with 
the collapse of large public companies. In the early 2000s, com-
panies such as Enron and WorldCom filed for bankruptcy in 
the wake of substantial accounting frauds. In addition to these 
two companies, there were many cases where the harm of secu-
 
 111. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (“If a company fails to 
satisfy its announced earnings projections—perhaps because of changes in the 
economy or the timing of an order or new product—the company is likely to 
face a lawsuit.”). 
 112. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (2012).  
 113. The problem was highlighted by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in a 
1998 speech called The Numbers Game. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, The Numbers Game (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www 
.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt. 
 114. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS UP-
DATE OF PUBLIC COMPANY TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, AND REGULATORY EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 11 (2006) (“The number of annual announcements of 
financial restatements generally increased, from 314 in 2002 to 523 in 2005 
. . . an increase of approximately 67 percent . . . . This constituted a nearly 
five-fold increase from 92 in 1997 to 523 in 2005.”). 
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rities fraud extended beyond shareholders to affect stakehold-
ers such as bondholders.  
In some eras, cries of securities fraud sound like sour-
grapes complaints from investors. Because share prices tend to 
fluctuate, investors should be well-aware of the potential for 
losses as the market reassesses the future prospects of a com-
pany. In other periods, frauds are more severe and involve mis-
statements that result in a permanent decline in the company’s 
prospects.  
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
As securities fraud evolves over time, so do the securities 
class actions that target such fraud. Causes of actions are 
adapted to new circumstances. Securities class actions seem 
meritless in some periods, but in others they help address sub-
stantial fraud. With bondholder class actions, there has been 
significant change in the typical section 11 cause of action. 
There is also potential for evolution with respect to the Rule 
10b-5 cause of action. 
1. Section 11 and Bondholder Class Actions 
When bondholders assert section 11 claims, they raise dif-
ferent concerns than posed by the traditional shareholder ac-
tion arising out of an IPO. In a substantial shift, the most sig-
nificant section 11 cases now assert claims on behalf of 
bondholders rather than shareholders.  
Section 11 suits originally focused on IPOs by start-up 
companies. The Securities Act of 1933 was directed at the prob-
lem of unscrupulous promoters who raised funds for new com-
panies of questionable value.115 The main concern with section 
11 has been its potential to raise the costs of going public.116 
When section 11 was enacted, there were concerns that the fear 
of liability would make it too expensive to raise capital through 
stock offerings.117 As noted earlier, criticisms of securities class 
actions were directed at the use of section 11 against specula-
tive technology companies. Section 11 has more recently been 
 
 115. Mahoney, supra note 110, at 1068–69. 
 116. See, e.g., James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Mar-
ket: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 
908 (1996) (“The cost of strike suits is especially burdensome for companies 
going public for the first time.”).  
 117. See Michael P. Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment 
Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776, 776 (1972).  
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described as a put option that provides costly insurance to in-
vestors for declines in new public issues,118 potentially raising 
the costs of innovative companies seeking to raise money 
through the public markets.119  
Bondholder class actions have introduced section 11 suits 
in a different context, the seasoned company selling debt to in-
vestors. Bondholders of large public companies affected by 
fraud have increasingly asserted section 11 claims. As noted 
earlier, 13 of the 19 Largest Bondholder Settlements were in 
cases with section 11 claims arising out of a bond offering, 
meaning that close to half of the Top 30 securities class action 
settlements involved fraud by a seasoned issuer selling bonds. 
Far from just regulating initial sales of stock, section 11 is be-
ing used to target frauds that occur years after a company goes 
public. 
Section 11 claims by bondholders are a way of remedying 
fraudulent sales of bonds that transfer value from bondholders 
to shareholders. Companies raising funds in the capital mar-
kets face liability if bond sales coincide with misrepresentations 
that hide facts indicating a significant risk of insolvency. Ab-
sent such fraud, bondholders would have charged more for in-
vesting in the offering, and shareholders would not have bene-
fitted from the lower cost of debt. Bondholder recoveries can be 
understood as transferring wealth from shareholders back to 
bondholders. Far from just protecting shareholders investing in 
risky IPOs, section 11 is playing a role in maintaining the in-
tegrity of bond sales by established companies. 
As noted earlier, because of the frequency of bond offerings, 
bondholders are more likely to have access to the lenient liabil-
 
 118. See James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1187, 1190 (2007) (“[B]ecause the shareholder purchases 
not just the firm’s equity but also a ‘put option’ exercisable in the bad state of 
the world, the shareholder pays more for the share-cum-option than she would 
have paid for just the share.”). 
 119. It is important to acknowledge that of the two types of securities class 
actions that plaintiffs can bring, cases brought under section 11 have been the 
less controversial. Because section 11 is limited to the particular situation 
where a company is selling securities to investors, there are fewer opportuni-
ties to use or abuse section 11. Moreover, unlike secondary market transac-
tions where the issuer does not trade, the context of a direct sale is one where 
the issuer directly benefits from the fraud at the expense of investors. Criti-
cisms of securities class actions have thus generally observed that section 11 is 
not as great an area of concern as Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-
forming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implemen-
tation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556–57 (2006). 
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ity standard of section 11 than shareholders. When a bond of-
fering coincides with a fraud, bondholders need not prove scien-
ter to recover, raising the possibility that recoveries result from 
a lower liability standard rather than greater merit. It would 
be troubling if bondholder recoveries under section 11 simply 
reflected the accident that a bond offering occurred during the 
period of the fraud. There is evidence, though, that bondholder 
recoveries are driven by more than the mere presence of a bond 
offering. While it is a small sample, 11 of the 13 Largest Bond-
holder Settlements with section 11 claims also involved a credit 
downgrade, indicating that there was an external event causing 
particular harm to bondholders. So long as bondholder class ac-
tions are driven by events of specific concern to bondholders, 
there is some assurance that the presence of a bond offering 
during the class period is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for a bondholder recovery.  
As many commentators have observed, section 11 claims 
involving seasoned issuers raise issues of special concern relat-
ing to the liability of third parties such as underwriters.120 In 
contrast to the new company that takes months to prepare a 
securities offering, the securities laws allow seasoned public is-
suers to execute an offering within a matter of days through 
what is called a shelf offering.121 Unlike the extensive disclosure 
prepared for an IPO, the disclosure relating to such an offering 
simply incorporates earlier periodic disclosures filed with the 
SEC.122 With a shelf offering, underwriters, who face liability 
under section 11, do not have as much time to perform due dili-
 
 120. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The 
Coming Debate over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 
1168–71 (1995); Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and 
Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1025–
32 (1984); Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering 
Liability in a Continuous Disclosure Environment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 45, 62 (2000).  
 121. For a discussion of the policy reasons behind integrated disclosure and 
shelf registration, see Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient 
Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135 
(1984). 
 122. Indeed, investors often rely mainly on the credit rating and character-
istics of the bond rather than extensively assess the issuer’s disclosures. See, 
e.g., Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of Task Force on 
Sellers’ Due Diligence and Similar Defenses Under the Federal Securities 
Laws, 48 BUS. LAW 1185, 1233 (1993) (“Debt securities involved in rule 415 
shelf takedowns . . . are sold to institutional investors on the basis of rating, 
name, and yield.”). 
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gence as they do with respect to an IPO.123 Because bondholder 
section 11 claims typically involve such seasoned companies, 
they pose the risk of imposing excessive liability on underwrit-
ers.124 
The data set shows that underwriters are held liable in 
some but not all cases where bondholders bring section 11 
claims. Of the 13 Largest Bondholder Settlements with section 
11 claims, underwriters contributed to the settlement in 5 of 
the 13 cases.125 These cases included notorious frauds such as 
Enron, WorldCom, HealthSouth, Adelphia, and Global Cross-
ing. With the exception of HealthSouth, all of these companies 
filed for bankruptcy.126 In the other 8 cases, though there was a 
bond offering and section 11 claims were asserted, underwrit-
ers did not contribute to the settlement. Only 2 of these compa-
nies, Delphi and the Williams Companies, filed for bankrupt-
cy.127  
Resolving the fairness of underwriter liability for shelf of-
ferings is beyond the scope of this article. However, the data 
provides support for the proposition that bondholders tend to 
recover meaningful amounts in a section 11 suit only when the 
offering is linked to a substantial fraud that dramatically 
changes the market’s assessment of a public company’s solven-
cy. Underwriters are not always found liable simply because a 
bond offering happens to coincide with a misleading disclosure. 
While there will be circumstances where it is unfair to hold un-
derwriters responsible for the failure of a company, there are 
circumstances where underwriters should be accountable for 
failing to detect the largest frauds.  
 
 123. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 120, at 1168 (“In a compressed time peri-
od, the underwriter cannot conduct the same ‘due diligence’ investigation that 
the ’33 Act intended in its provisions for a ‘due diligence’ affirmative defense to 
civil liability under Sections 11 and 12(a).”); Fox, supra note 120, at 1006 (“A 
major criticism of Rule 415 is that this speed and flexibility impede an under-
writer’s ability to perform ‘due diligence,’ its statutorily induced investigation 
of the accuracy of the information contained in the registration statement.”); 
Langevoort, supra note 120, at 62 (“There may be no time for serious due dili-
gence between the decision to proceed, at which point the underwriters are se-
lected and notified, and the sales.”).  
 124. In the WorldCom case, a court held the underwriters to a high stand-
ard, requiring that they follow up on red flags and do more than a cursory in-
vestigation to take advantage of the due diligence defense. See In re WorldCom 
Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
 125. See infra Appendix, Table A1. 
 126. See supra Table 2.  
 127. See id. 
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Bondholder recoveries in section 11 cases illustrate how 
the securities fraud statutes adapt over time. It is doubtful that 
the legislative drafters of section 11 anticipated that the stat-
ute would be used so frequently by investors to recover damag-
es for fraud relating to some of the largest public companies. 
Just a few years prior to the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, 
the most extensive and sophisticated study of section 11 suits 
involving IPOs concluded that most of the suits were without 
merit.128 Though there is controversy surrounding securities 
class actions, very few commentators would deny that a signifi-
cant number of the cases in the early 2000s have targeted real 
cases of fraud. At the very least, the issues raised by the new 
bondholder section 11 cases differ from those raised by the tra-
ditional shareholder section 11 cases. The securities class ac-
tion has evolved with the times, and efforts to reform the secu-
rities class action should take into account the possibility that a 
remedy that seems wasteful in one period may be useful in an-
other.  
2. Rule 10b-5 and Bondholder Class Actions 
Bondholder class actions could potentially add another di-
mension to the controversial Rule 10b-5 action for secondary 
market fraud. When a fraud affects investors purchasing older 
bonds in the secondary market, investors will not be able to 
meet the one-year statute of limitations governing section 11 
claims.129 Such bondholders can use Rule 10b-5 to recover when 
a fraud hides credit risk at the time the bond was purchased. 
Rule 10b-5 recoveries have tended to be smaller than section 11 
recoveries, but with the rise in bondholder class actions, it is 
possible that an increasing portion of 10b-5 recoveries will go to 
bondholders.  
Fraud-on-the-market claims have been criticized as result-
ing in useless transfers among shareholders. The main version 
of this critique argues that compensation for Rule 10b-5 claims 
is a circular shifting of losses from shareholders to them-
selves.130 Put another way, when shareholders suffer losses 
 
 128. Bohn & Choi, supra note 116, at 979 (“This Article’s empirical results 
show that most securities-fraud class actions are, in fact, frivolous.”).  
 129. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (2012). 
 130. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtu-
ous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 509 (1997) (“[A] circularity problem arises for set-
tlements of securities class actions . . . . [T]he plaintiffs necessarily provide, 
albeit indirectly, some portion of their own settlement recovery.”); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. 
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from fraud in secondary markets, any recovery they obtain 
comes from corporate revenue, reducing shareholder earnings, 
or from an insurance policy that is funded by the shareholders. 
Though this transfer is no worse than a dividend,131 the circu-
larity of shareholder compensation reduces the loss spreading 
function of securities class actions.132  
In contrast, successful bondholder class actions result in a 
non-circular transfer from shareholders to bondholders. When 
a bondholder recovers from an issuer under Rule 10b-5, that 
 
REV. 639, 649 (1996) (“[M]oney paid out by the issuer itself is essentially taken 
from the company’s shareholders . . . .”).  
 131. James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 323, 325 (2009). 
 132. A second version of the circularity problem argues that because most 
investors are diversified, they are just as likely to be beneficiaries of securities 
fraud as victims. See, e.g., Amanda Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Liti-
gation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1679, 1688 (2011) (“[D]iversified investors both buy 
and sell shares on the stock market . . . . [And] are just as likely to benefit 
from fraud that inflates stock prices as they are to be injured by it, and these 
gains and losses are likely to net out over time.”). While investors who buy a 
security at an inflated price lose from the transaction, investors who sell the 
security at an inflated price win from the transaction. Over time, an investor 
with a diversified portfolio should not suffer significant losses from fraud on 
the market.  
Put more concretely, consider a situation where an investor has a portfolio 
of two stocks—Stock A and Stock B. Suppose the investor purchases Stock A 
for $5 a share, but it turns out that Stock A is inflated by fraud and only worth 
$4 a share. The transaction results in a $1 loss for the investor from securities 
fraud. In a different transaction, the investor sells Stock B for $5 a share, 
though in reality Stock B is inflated by fraud and only worth $4 a share. This 
transaction results in a $1 gain for the investor from securities fraud. Assum-
ing these are the only two stocks in the investor’s portfolio, the gain from 
fraud exactly offsets the loss from fraud.  
In some cases, the circularity-diversification argument will apply to bond-
holders just as much as it does to shareholders. Bondholders might benefit 
from securities fraud in some transactions even while being harmed in others. 
But there is reason to believe that for the largest frauds, the circularity-
diversification argument is less likely to protect bondholders from fraud. Be-
cause bondholders have limited upside to their investment, it will be more dif-
ficult for significant losses to be offset by significant gains in the bondholder’s 
portfolio.  
Another concrete example illustrates this point. Suppose a bondholder 
owns two bonds—Bond A and Bond B. The bondholder purchases Bond A for a 
$100 par value investment, but it turns out that Bond A is inflated by fraud 
and is only worth $75. The transaction results in a $25 loss for the bondholder. 
To offset that loss, the bondholder would have to have a transaction in his 
portfolio where he sells a bond inflated by $25. For conservative investors who 
purchase bonds at par value, such transactions will be unlikely because bonds 
do not participate in earnings growth and have a limited upside. In contrast, it 
is more likely that an investor would have a stock in his portfolio that is in-
flated by significant amounts because of the greater volatility of stocks. 
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payment essentially comes from shareholders. Any bondholder 
recovery that comes directly from the company is an expense 
that reduces shareholder earnings. Or, the payment comes 
from an insurance policy that was essentially funded by share-
holders over time. Because bondholder compensation is a trans-
fer from shareholders to bondholders, bondholder securities 
class actions avoid the problem of circular loss shifting from 
shareholder to shareholder.  
Bondholder compensation for fraud is attractive not only 
because it avoids the problem of circularity, but because as not-
ed earlier, shareholders tend to benefit more from securities 
fraud than bondholders. Circular loss shifting seems especially 
unwarranted when shareholders are compensating themselves 
for risks that might have benefitted them if successful. On the 
other hand, compensating bondholders for losses caused by 
risks that they would not have preferred is more consistent 
with a just policy of compensation. 
Most significant bondholder recoveries occur in the context 
of bond offerings, but bondholders do at times recover for sec-
ondary market fraud. Indeed, more than half of all bondholder 
recoveries involve cases with only Rule 10b-5 claims. Even 
when section 11 claims are asserted, complaints typically also 
allege Rule 10b-5 claims. For example, as noted earlier, in the 
Enron and WorldCom cases, where bondholders recovered un-
der section 11, a significant portion of the recovery also went to 
bondholders who purchased in secondary markets.133  
Bondholders can protect themselves from the effects of sec-
ondary market fraud in various ways, but such protection does 
not eliminate the need for a remedy. First, like shareholders, a 
bondholder can diversify, which would mean that a smaller 
portion of its portfolio would be exposed to fraud losses.134 How-
ever, even when diversified, bond holdings in a particular issu-
er tend to be quite large,135 meaning that even diversified bond-
 
 133. See supra Part III. 
 134. See, e.g., Amihud et al., supra note 23, at 461 (“An investor can thus 
diversify away the firm-specific, or idiosyncratic, risk associated with the 
bonds of any single company.”). 
Investors might also be diversified across asset classes, meaning that they 
hold not only bonds but stocks. Gains from one part of the portfolio could offset 
losses from another part of the portfolio. 
 135. Bond transactions are generally much larger than stock transactions. 
In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 632 (N.D. Ala. 2009) 
(“When bonds do trade, however, the trades tend to be at least fifty times as 
large as typical stock exchange transactions.”). Most corporate bonds are held 
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holders can suffer meaningful losses from fraud. Second, bond-
holders can protect themselves by hedging. An investor can en-
ter into a credit default swap, which insures against losses 
caused by bond defaults.136 The obvious cost to hedging is that 
returns from investing in the bond will be reduced by the price 
of the hedge. To the extent that securities fraud is deterred, in-
vestors will need to spend less to hedge against the risk of 
fraud. 
Protecting bondholders from secondary market fraud could 
be criticized on the ground that doing so would primarily pro-
tect speculators rather than long-term investors.137 Consider a 
case where the price of a company’s bonds has fallen from 
$1000 to $800 based on fears of the company’s solvency. A 
speculator purchases bonds for $800, betting that the company 
will recover. Later, the market learns that the company failed 
to reveal facts indicating that its condition is much worse, and 
when the truth comes out, the bond prices plummet to $500 a 
share. Should the speculator be permitted to bring a claim un-
der Rule 10b-5 for securities fraud to recover its losses? On the 
one hand, offering such a remedy rewards speculators who 
should know they are taking on significant risk. On the other 
hand, the availability of such a remedy provides speculators 
with greater incentive to purchase bonds in secondary markets, 
which could benefit bondholders who want to exit a volatile in-
vestment. Especially as bond markets become more efficient,138 
a Rule 10b-5 remedy can provide modest assurance for inves-
 
by institutions. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 45 (“The corporate bond market 
is primarily an institutional market.”). As a result, “ownership of bonds of any 
particular issue tends to be highly concentrated, that is, a relatively small 
number of investors generally owns a high fraction of the bonds of a single is-
sue.” Kahan, supra note 107, at 584; see also Schultz, supra note 45, at 679 
(“Also contributing to the lack of volume is the fact that institutions buy bonds 
in sufficiently large quantities that even the largest issues can be held entirely 
by 200 or fewer institutions.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Longstaff et al., supra note 12, at 2216 (“Credit derivatives 
are contingent claims with payoffs that are linked to the creditworthiness of a 
given firm or sovereign entity.”); Partnoy, supra note 22, at 678. 
 137. Bondholders vary in the amount of trading they do. See, e.g., Sugato 
Chakravarty & Asani Sarkar, Trading Costs in Three U.S. Bond Markets, 13 
J. FIXED INCOME 39, 40–41 (2003) (noting that insurance companies tend to be 
“buy and hold” investors in bonds while pension funds and hedge funds “are 
reputed to trade more frequently”).  
 138. In the future, bond markets may become more efficient. Efforts are 
being made to create new platforms for bond trading. See Serena Ng & Kirsten 
Grind, Firms in Talks on Bond Trading, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2012, at C1. 
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tors that they can rely upon market prices, increasing liquidity 
in those markets.  
Bondholder class actions asserting Rule 10b-5 claims for 
secondary market fraud are not vulnerable to some of the criti-
cisms of similar shareholder class actions. The recovery for 
such claims have been relatively small, but such claims could 
increase in importance as bond markets become more liquid 
and bondholders continue to assert claims.  
V.  BONDHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE   
Bondholders generally cannot bring suit against directors 
and officers under state corporate law, but with bondholder 
class actions they are not completely without recourse when 
managers secretly take on excessive risk to benefit sharehold-
ers. To the extent that bondholders increasingly recover for se-
curities fraud, the prevailing view that the interests of bond-
holders have no place in corporate governance will be modified. 
Section A describes the absence of bondholder rights under 
state corporate law. Section B examines how securities class ac-
tions can address corporate governance issues. Section C ar-
gues that bondholder class actions address a particular govern-
ance concern, excessive risk-taking on behalf of shareholders 
that impacts corporate stakeholders.  
A. THE LACK OF BONDHOLDER RIGHTS UNDER CORPORATE LAW 
In corporate law, an important distinction between share-
holders and bondholders is that shareholders are protected by 
fiduciary duties, enforceable through derivative suits, while 
bondholders are not.139 A basic reason for the differing treat-
ment of shareholders and bondholders is that shareholders are 
essentially owners of the corporation,140 while bondholders are 
outside creditors who are dealt with at arms-length. Fiduciary 
 
 139. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 
A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) (“When a corporation is solvent, those [fiduciary] du-
ties may be enforced by its shareholders, who have standing to bring deriva-
tive actions on behalf of the corporation because they are the ultimate benefi-
ciaries of the corporation’s growth and increased value.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Brooks v. Weiser, 57 F.R.D. 491, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“The 
fact that among the plethora of derivative suits brought over the generations 
none even discuss the issue reflects the obviousness of the proposition that the 
right to sue derivatively is an attribute of ownership, justified on the theory 
that the plaintiff in such a suit seeks to recover what belongs to the corpora-
tion, because as a co-owner, it also belongs to him.”). 
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duties are triggered by the special relationship directors and 
officers have with the shareholders,141 who appoint directors to 
serve their interests. In contrast, bondholders have no voting 
rights or fiduciary relationship with corporate managers. At-
tempts by bond investors to bring derivative suits with respect 
to solvent companies have thus largely failed,142 with the courts 
holding that bondholder rights are limited to the contractual 
provisions negotiated with corporate issuers.143  
A drawback of the traditional focus on shareholder rights 
is that the interests of stakeholders essential to the functioning 
of the corporation will not be considered when they conflict 
with the interests of shareholders. Corporate law scholars have 
often observed that the goals of shareholders and bondholders 
can diverge.144 Corporate managers who seek to maximize 
 
 141. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (noting that di-
rectors have “the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation 
for the benefit of its shareholder owners”). 
 142. See, e.g., Harff v. Kerkorian, 347 A.2d 133, 134 (Del. 1975) (per 
curiam) (affirming a ruling that “debenture holders lack standing under Del-
aware law to sue derivatively because they are not ‘stockholders’”); Brooks v. 
Weiser, 57 F.R.D. 491, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). State law does provide bondhold-
ers with a cause of action for fraud, see, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 
303 (Del. 1988), but class actions asserting state fraud claims relating to secu-
rities are likely preempted by federal law. See Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227. 
 143. See cases cited supra note 5. Bondholders can bring derivative actions 
alleging a breach of fiduciary duty when the company has filed for bankruptcy, 
see, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101 (“[T]he creditors of an insolvent corpora-
tion have standing to maintain derivative claims against directors on behalf of 
the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties.”), but such suits are rare. See 
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
669, 720 (1993) (“Neither creditors nor shareholders are likely to take formal 
legal action against managers for perceived breaches of the managers’ fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty.”); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 23, at 302 (noting 
that bondholders rarely sue for breach of covenant). Such suits would also be 
limited by the business judgment rule. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado 
About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. 
& TECH. L. 336, 368 (2007).  
 144. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist 
Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1288 (2008) (“Even when a company is-
sues only two kinds of securities—say, common stock and debt—options theory 
predicts an inevitable conflict of interest between the debtholders (who want 
to preserve the company’s ‘equity cushion’ and avoid risk) and the stockholders 
(who favor risk because they enjoy all the upside while sharing the burden of 
the downside with the debtholders).”); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 143, at 
684 (footnote omitted) (“[W]hen a marginally solvent company engages in high 
risk investment, the risks are borne primarily by creditors while the benefits 
accrue primarily to shareholders.”).  
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shareholder wealth can do so in a way that undermines the in-
terests of bondholders. Some scholars have therefore argued 
that corporate law should take into account bondholder con-
cerns. For example, reacting largely to the financing in the 
1980s of takeovers with the issuance of additional debt that in-
creased risk for corporate bondholders, a number of commenta-
tors argued that corporate law fiduciary duties should be ex-
tended to bondholders.145  
Proposals to directly enhance the corporate law rights of 
bondholders have not gained much traction, in part because 
bondholder abuse in hostile takeovers and buyouts declined 
substantially in the 1990s.146 Another reason might be that 
bondholders are less concerned than shareholders about corpo-
rate governance except in times when a company is close to in-
solvency. So long as there is a substantial equity cushion, bonds 
will retain their value and bondholders have little incentive to 
be concerned with corporate governance. As a result, the tradi-
tional conception of limited rights for bondholders still domi-
nates corporate law.147 
 
 145. See, e.g., Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. 
CORP. L. 205, 206 (1988) (“[C]ourts should declare that directors have a fiduci-
ary duty to deal fairly with all of the investors in a corporation—bondholders 
as well as stockholders.”); Mitchell, supra note 5, at 1168 (arguing that extend-
ing “additional rights to bondholders promotes corporate social responsibil-
ity”); Note, Creditors’ Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Corporations, 88 
YALE L.J. 1299, 1301 (1979) (“This Note argues that creditors of a solvent cor-
poration should have a statutory right to bring suit in the name of the corpo-
ration against its directors for breaching the trust of their office.”); Note, Pub-
lic Creditors of Financial Institutions: The Case for a Derivative Right of 
Action, 86 YALE L.J. 1422, 1456 (1977) (“[O]fficers and directors of financial 
intermediaries owe a fiduciary duty to their public creditors not to deal with 
their institutions for their own accounts or derive personal profit from trans-
actions in which their institutions engage.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equi-
ty Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate 
Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 226 (2009) (“The mid-to-late part of the 
1980s was an active period for LBOs, before market conditions changed and 
LBO activity declined rather sharply in the early 1990s.”).  
 147. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History 
for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001) (“The principal elements of 
this emerging consensus are that ultimate control over the corporation should 
rest with the shareholder class; the managers of the corporation should be 
charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its 
shareholders; other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees, 
suppliers, and customers, should have their interests protected by contractual 
and regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate govern-
ance . . . .”). 
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B. SECURITIES FRAUD AS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURE 
Unlike corporate law, the securities laws provide bond-
holders with essentially the same causes of action as share-
holders. To the extent that securities class actions can be used 
to challenge corporate misconduct, they provide bondholders 
with a mechanism for asserting their interests that is not pro-
vided by corporate law.  
Securities fraud is perhaps the most visible result of poor 
corporate governance. Inactive and captured boards, imperial 
CEOs, self-dealing managers, unfair compensation structures, 
and other corporate governance failures can contribute to an 
environment where securities fraud is more likely. The cases 
where investors suffer the greatest losses often coincide with 
the worst breaches of fiduciary duties by management. 
If securities fraud is one result of corporate governance 
failure, securities class actions inevitably address issues relat-
ing to corporate law.148 Professors Robert Thompson and Hillary 
Sale go so far as to say that “federal securities law and en-
forcement via securities fraud class actions today have become 
the most visible means of regulating corporate governance.”149 
Indeed, there can be overlap between the typical securities 
fraud claim and corporate law duty of care violations.150 A fail-
ure to act with care can result in conditions conducive to securi-
ties fraud. For example, a corporation may take on ill-advised 
risk that causes poor economic performance and then take 
steps to hide those mistakes. Punishing the failure to disclose 
risk would indirectly hold the corporation accountable for the 
lack of care that resulted in the fraud. If a corporation knows it 
cannot hide incompetent conduct without the possibility of pun-
 
 148. In addition, corporate derivative suits appear to be addressing issues 
relating to securities fraud. One study of 160 derivative suits filed in 2005 and 
2006 found that “more than 90% included allegations of false or misleading 
statements, the same allegations that are the cornerstone of fraud claims.” 
Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examina-
tion, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 70 (2011). 
 149. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003).  
 150. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 
58 (1993) (“A duty of care suit can also arise under the federal securities laws 
for such ‘plain vanilla’ accounting misconduct as inventory deficiency fraud, 
improper income recognition or improper accounting for goodwill.”); Thompson 
& Sale, supra note 149, at 889 (noting that securities class actions can target 
earnings management cases where “the managers have caused the corporation 
to do something that has made the corporation’s shares less valuable and, 
thereby, harmed the shareholders”).  
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ishment, there will be additional incentives to avoid such con-
duct in the first place.  
Some commentators have been skeptical that securities 
fraud class actions have a meaningful and desirable impact on 
corporate governance. In a thoughtful article, Professors Wil-
liam Bratton and Michael Wachter express doubt that securi-
ties class actions can be justified on the grounds that they pro-
mote better corporate governance.151 Bratton and Wachter 
observe, as others have, that there are questions as to whether 
securities class actions do much to deter misconduct because 
they rarely hold individuals personally liable for securities 
fraud.152 Additionally, they argue that to the extent they affect 
corporate behavior, securities class actions are an end-run 
around the choice of many companies in Delaware to essential-
ly opt out of the duty of care.153  
There is a tension between these two arguments. On the 
one hand, securities class actions are criticized for not doing 
enough to directly deter corporate misconduct by individuals. 
On the other hand, securities class actions are criticized for se-
cond-guessing the decision of many corporations to opt out of 
individual liability for corporate wrongdoing. Much of the per-
ceived dysfunction of securities class actions stems from the dif-
ficulty of reconciling such competing considerations. 
Indeed, any corporate litigation regime must find a balance 
between the policy goal of deterring corporate misconduct and 
the policy goal of minimizing the costs of such liability. The 
current state of securities class actions reflects a compromise 
between these two goals. Corporations are potentially liable for 
securities fraud, but individual managers are shielded except in 
the most egregious cases. Deterrence is not completely elimi-
nated under this balance. In some cases, individuals are re-
quired to contribute to securities class action settlements.154 
The system deters the worst cases of fraud while protecting in-
dividuals from liability in most cases.  
 
 151. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of 
Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 118–33 (2011). 
 152. Id. at 124 (“[A securities class action] almost never holds anyone to an 
individual admission of liability, much less individual accountability . . . .”). 
 153. Id. at 128 (observing that “corporations—with their shareholders’ ap-
proval—have decided that the benefits of care-based litigation are not worth 
the costs” and that shareholders might opt out of securities class actions). 
 154. In the Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Rite Aid settlements, 
directors and officers personally contributed to the settlement. See infra Ap-
pendix, Table A1.  
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Securities class actions are not substantially in conflict 
with the corporate law regime of Delaware. As noted earlier, 
individuals rarely personally contribute to securities class ac-
tions, making the system similar to the Delaware system, 
which has virtually eliminated personal liability for the duty of 
care through section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corpo-
rate Law.155 Moreover, residual liability for the worst forms of 
securities fraud is not inconsistent with Delaware law. Section 
102(b)(7) does not allow corporations to eliminate liability for 
breaches of the duty of loyalty and duty of good faith.156 Some 
securities class actions raise issues relating to loyalty when the 
fraud is motivated by a desire to personally enrich manage-
ment. Moreover, because the conduct targeted by the securities 
laws requires a showing of scienter, or fraudulent intent,157 the 
worst cases of securities fraud will likely involve the sort of 
conscious disregard of duty that violates Delaware’s duty of 
good faith.158 Delaware does not permit companies to opt out of 
these duties, and it is far from clear that corporations would 
opt out of liability for the worst forms of misconduct by man-
agement.159 
C. SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS AND BONDHOLDER INTERESTS 
The rise of bondholder class actions adds a new dimension 
to the influence of securities class actions on corporate govern-
ance. Securities class actions do more than create additional 
corporate law for shareholders. Bondholder class actions ad-
dress fraud that seeks to benefit shareholders at the expense of 
bondholders.  
Securities class actions allow bondholders to assert claims 
when corporations take on excessive risk for shareholders 
without disclosing such risk. While the harm from fraud affects 
 
 155. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 151, at 127. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
 158. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 62–68 (Del. 
2006) (discussing several definitions of the duty of good faith and noting that 
“a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities” can violate the duty); Hillary 
A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 493 (2004) (likening 
the duty of good faith to a scienter standard). 
 159. To the extent that duty of care claims are intertwined with duty of 
loyalty or duty of good faith claims, derivative claims may proceed without 
running afoul of 102(b)(7). See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 926 (Del. 
2000) (noting that affirmative defenses under 102(b)(7) “cannot provide protec-
tion for directors who breach their duty of loyalty”).  
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both shareholders and bondholders, many bondholder class ac-
tions have alleged distinct harm to bondholders. In the section 
11 context, bondholders can obtain relief when firms misrepre-
sent their condition to sell debt, a fraud which transfers wealth 
from bondholders to shareholders. As noted earlier, 13 of the 19 
Largest Bondholder Settlements include section 11 claims al-
leging that the corporation defrauded bondholders so it could 
raise funds for shareholders. In the Rule 10b-5 context, bond-
holders can obtain relief when firms endanger their credit rat-
ings by taking on undisclosed risk to inflate a company’s stock 
price. Fifteen of the 19 Largest Bondholder Settlements in-
volved a credit downgrade, an event that has particular impli-
cations for bondholders.  
Bondholder class actions address the most egregious abus-
es by corporate managers while respecting the basic corporate 
law distinction between shareholders and bondholders.160 In 
normal periods, the interests of bondholders are not a major 
concern of corporate governance, and managers should rightly 
focus on the interests of shareholders. But when there is a 
temptation to gamble with bondholder funds on behalf of 
shareholders, or a temptation to inflate the company’s stock 
price by taking on hidden risks that threaten the company’s 
credit rating, the securities laws require consideration of bond-
holder interests because such laws provide a remedy for such 
misconduct.  
The fact that bondholder recoveries come from funds origi-
nating from shareholders distinguishes the corporate govern-
ance impact of bondholder class actions from shareholder class 
actions where funds are transferred between shareholders. To 
the extent that bondholder recoveries are transfers from share-
holders to bondholders, they are a modest check on the tenden-
cy to favor shareholders in all aspects of corporate governance. 
Such transfers are appropriate given that shareholders tend to 
benefit from successful frauds, while bondholders do not.  
When directors and officers face personal liability for cor-
porate misconduct, it is likely that the source of that liability 
will be a securities class action involving bondholder interests. 
Though in most cases, the liability of individuals is covered by 
D&O insurance, in a few notable cases with bondholder recov-
eries—Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Rite Aid—
 
 160. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of 
Convertible Bonds, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 667, 734 (1984) (noting that federal se-
curities laws are evidence that bondholders deserve protection). 
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directors and officers personally contributed to the settle-
ment.161 It is possible that managers would have personally 
contributed even if only shareholders were bringing claims, but 
the case for personal liability is strongest for the most severe 
frauds that cause significant harm to stakeholders.162  
Personal liability is a rare occurrence, but even a few cases 
of such liability could create a deterrent effect. Counsel briefing 
a new director about the potential for personal liability should 
discuss federal securities law cases such as WorldCom, caution-
ing the director that personal liability is possible under the se-
curities laws when securities fraud hides information that 
would lead to credit downgrades, bankruptcy, and harm to 
stakeholders such as bondholders. Given the frequency of debt 
offerings in large public corporations, an informed board of di-
rectors will know they will face the highest risk of liability 
when fraud significantly harms the interests of those bond-
holders. The current system of limiting personal liability to the 
worst cases of fraud perhaps strikes the right balance by mini-
mizing the possibility that managers will be chilled from active 
decision-making. Securities class actions create normative out-
er boundaries that should not unduly burden law-abiding cor-
porations.  
While the use of the federal securities laws to influence 
state corporate governance could have federalism implications, 
in the case of bondholder class actions, the tension between 
federal and state interests is likely to be low. Unlike one-size-
fit-all mandatory rules, securities class actions tend to raise 
corporate governance issues on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, 
as noted earlier, bondholders recover for securities fraud less 
frequently than shareholders. Only exceptional frauds will 
 
 161. See infra Appendix, Table A1. In the Enron case, the outside directors 
contributed $13 million. Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Directors of Enron To Chip in on 
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at C1. In the WorldCom case, the outside 
directors contributed $24.5 million and a number of executives also made per-
sonal contributions. Masters & Day, supra note 4. In the Global Crossing case, 
the Chairman contributed $30 million. Gretchen Morgenson, Global Crossing 
Settles Suit on Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at C1. In the Rite Aid case, 
the CEO contributed $1,450,000. Rite Aid’s Ex-CEO Settles Lawsuit, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/apr/10/business/fi 
-rup10.1. It is important to note that these payments are still the exception 
rather than the rule. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, 
Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (2006) (“Outside direc-
tors make personal payments in a tiny percentage of cases.”).  
 162. For an analysis of how securities fraud affects stakeholders, see Urska 
Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887 (2013).  
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trigger scrutiny of managers through bondholder litigation. Fi-
nally, if bondholder class actions encourage more effective risk-
management, such a norm is not inconsistent with Delaware 
law.163 
Bondholder class actions fit within a broader trend of cor-
porate governance scholarship encouraging consideration of the 
interests of stakeholders such as bondholders. Professors Luci-
an Bebchuk and Holger Spamann argue that banks, which tend 
to have significant amounts of debt, should link executive pay 
packages to a “broader basket of securities than common shares 
and preferred shares,” including “all outstanding bonds.”164 In 
doing so, managers would have more incentive to rein in out-
sized risks that threaten the solvency of the corporation. On the 
other hand, compensation linked to debt would move corporate 
law from its traditional focus on shareholders and perhaps 
make executives too risk-averse. 
Bondholder class actions are a less intrusive way of dealing 
with the worst forms of managerial misconduct than creating 
obligations to stakeholders, either through fiduciary duties or 
compensation structures. Rather than controlling management 
ex ante through measures that blur the line between share-
holders and bondholders, bondholder class actions provide a 
remedy ex post that provides bondholders with relief for the 
worst forms of corporate misconduct. 
VI.  THE FUTURE OF BONDHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS   
This Part considers some practical implications of this Ar-
ticle’s findings. Courts should take into account the distinct 
situation of bondholders when adjudicating securities class ac-
tions. Section A proposes that courts could modify the fraud-on-
the-market presumption when considering whether a class of 
bondholders should be certified so that it focuses on the reli-
 
 163. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (“[A] director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good 
faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system . . . exists, 
and that failure to do so . . . may, in theory at least, render a director liable for 
losses . . . .”). 
 164. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 
GEO. L.J. 247, 284 (2010). Bankruptcy, where bondholders are essentially the 
residual claimant, is another context where debt might make sense as a form 
of executive compensation. See Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bank-
ruptcy: Why CEOs Should Be Compensated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 
800 (2007) (“To improve managerial performance, I propose that the commit-
tee be granted the right to award managers a percentage of the unsecured 
debt of the insolvent firm.”). 
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ance of bondholders on credit ratings. Section B contends that 
when there is tension between bondholder and shareholder in-
terests in a securities class action, bondholders should be rep-
resented by independent counsel. 
A. THE FRAUD-ON-THE-CREDIT-RATING-AGENCY PRESUMPTION 
There is significant uncertainty in the law governing 
whether a class of bondholders can be certified in Rule 10b-5 
cases. Part of the problem is that some courts have not recog-
nized that bond markets operate differently than stock mar-
kets. While shareholders mainly rely on the integrity of effi-
cient markets, bondholders mainly rely on the integrity of 
credit ratings. 
For bondholders to be certified as a class, they must estab-
lish commonality.165 For Rule 10b-5 cases, the main element 
where commonality among investors is in question is reli-
ance.166 As noted earlier, many shareholders do not actually re-
ly on a particular misstatement, making it difficult to establish 
common reliance. Instead, they can be certified as a class 
through the fraud-on-the-market presumption, which presumes 
that shareholders relied upon the integrity of market prices 
when a stock trades in an efficient market.167 Many courts have 
found that bonds of large public companies trade in efficient 
markets and have permitted bondholders to use the fraud-on-
the-market presumption.168 In a 2010 decision, though, a dis-
trict court in the Southern District of New York found that the 
bonds of AIG, one of the largest public companies at the time, 
did not trade in an efficient market.169 In reaching its decision, 
the court relied partly on the fact that the bonds did not trade 
on a number of days when bad news about AIG was disclosed.170 
 
 165. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 166. In contrast, section 11 does not have a reliance requirement. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77k (2012).  
 167. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1988).  
 168. See cases cited supra note 50. 
 169. In re Am. Int’l Grp. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
vacated and remanded by 689 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 170. Id. at 180. Even though the plaintiff’s expert showed that AIG bonds 
traded in greater volume and amount than average bonds, the court found 
that this was not sufficient to establish market efficiency. Id. at 177. At least 
one group of commentators has been critical of the court’s findings. See, e.g., 
Hartzmark, supra note 2 (criticizing failure of court to certify class of bond-
holders in securities class action against AIG). It may be that not much should 
be made of the AIG decision as it partly rests on failures by the plaintiff’s ex-
pert to offer sufficient proof. In future cases, experts could offer proof of effi-
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The AIG opinion highlights the potential problem bond-
holders have with relying on the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion.171 Because bonds trade less frequently than stocks, bond 
prices do not fluctuate as much as stock prices, suggesting that 
bond markets are less likely to be efficient than stock mar-
kets.172 The AIG opinion attempted to formulate a general pre-
requisite for bondholders to invoke the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption. It noted the absence of “any court in this jurisdic-
tion that has found debt securities to trade in an efficient mar-
ket without first having found that the price of those bonds is 
responsive to company-specific news at a statistically signifi-
cant level.”173 If this test for efficiency is read as encompassing 
all “company-specific” news, very few bond markets will qualify 
as efficient.  
Applying the efficient markets hypothesis to bond investors 
is problematic because bond markets are concerned with a nar-
rower range of information than stock markets. The focus on 
bond markets is on information that substantially changes the 
risk of an issuer’s insolvency. For example, a company that 
goes from a 1% risk of insolvency to a 50% risk of insolvency 
will see its bond prices plummet. Even smaller increases can 
affect bond prices depending on the expectations of bond inves-
tors. An increase in the risk of insolvency from 1% to 5% may 
 
ciency that would be sufficient.  
 171. After the district court’s decision, various defendants agreed to set-
tlements where about 5% of the recovery was allocated to bondholders. Notice 
of Proposed Settlement, Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses Award and 
Fairness Hearing, supra note 98. 
 172. Moreover, a distinct test for judging whether bondholders can rely on 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption has not yet emerged. See, e.g., In re En-
ron Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (“[N]o standard at all appears to have been 
established for measuring market efficiency for debt securities.”). In the ab-
sence of such a standard, courts have generally applied the Cammer test, 
which sets forth a number of criteria used to determine whether a market for 
an issuer’s stock is efficient. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp., 265 F.R.D. at 175–
76 (noting the lack of a clear standard and applying the Cammer test). In as-
sessing whether a security trades in an efficient market, the Cammer test 
looks at whether there is: “(1) a large weekly trading volume; (2) a significant 
number of securities analysts following and reporting on a company’s stock; (3) 
the presence of market makers and arbitrageurs who are able to react swiftly 
to company news and drive the stock price; (4) the eligibility of the company to 
file an S-3 Registration Statement for its public offerings; and (5) empirical 
facts showing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate 
events or financial releases and an immediate response in the stock price.” Id. 
at 176 (quoting In re SCOR Holding AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 574 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 173. In re Am. Int’l Grp., 265 F.R.D. at 180–81. 
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be a significant development for an investor in AAA bonds. In 
contrast, an increase in the risk of insolvency of a similar mag-
nitude—say from 30% to 35%—may not be as important for a 
holder of a junk bond, where there is already a substantial risk 
of insolvency.  
To the extent that investors uniformly focus on the credit 
risk of a bond, it is likely they will rely in part on credit ratings 
in their decision to purchase a bond. When such a rating is 
based on fraudulent disclosures, bondholders can argue they all 
relied on a rating that was obtained or maintained through 
fraud.174 Indeed, in the AIG case, credit rating agencies down-
graded AIG’s credit rating in the wake of the events at issue,175 
a fact not emphasized by the court in its decision. 
Rather than judge bondholder class actions based on a me-
chanical application of the various factors relevant to stock 
market efficiency, courts could allow bondholders to meet their 
burden of establishing uniform reliance by showing they relied 
upon a credit rating that was based on fraudulent disclo-
sures.176 Put another way, instead of utilizing a fraud-on-the-
market presumption, bondholders could use a fraud-on-the-
credit-rating-agency presumption.177 Alternatively, courts 
should focus not on whether bond markets react to all infor-
mation, but on whether they react to information that signifi-
cantly affects the credit risk of the issuer.178 Such modifications 
 
 174. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 638 
(N.D. Ala. 2009) (“The publicly available financial information affected the 
credit rating for HealthSouth bonds in much the same way information affects 
the price of stock in an efficient market for stock; and the credit ratings—
along with other publicly available information—likewise affected the price of 
the HealthSouth bonds.”).  
 175. Consolidated Third Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 765–73, In re 
Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., Master File No. 04 Civ. 8141 (JES)(AJP) 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006). 
 176. In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a defendant could rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
“through evidence that an alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect the 
market price of the stock.” 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014). Similarly, in a bond-
holder class action, a defendant could provide evidence that the misrepresen-
tation had no impact on the company’s credit rating. 
 177. Thanks to Jeff Manns for suggesting this phrase. 
 178. A separate but related issue is that of loss causation. To establish a 
Rule 10b-5 claim, the plaintiff must show that the alleged fraud caused the 
alleged loss. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). Be-
cause bonds respond to many factors, such as interest rate fluctuations, it 
might be difficult to isolate what part of the bond’s price decline can be at-
tributed to the revelation of the fraud. In cases where the issue of causation is 
difficult to resolve, a court might adjust the recovery of bondholders to take 
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to the fraud-on-the-market test for bondholders would more 
fairly reflect the contexts where bondholders are uniformly de-
frauded.  
B. REPRESENTING BONDHOLDER INTERESTS 
As bondholder involvement in securities class actions in-
creases, courts should do more to ensure that the distinct inter-
ests of bond investors are adequately represented. As this study 
has shown, the current trend has been to merge bondholders 
and shareholders into one class of publicly traded securities.179 
Only 1 of the 19 Largest Bondholder Settlements had a class of 
bondholders represented by separate counsel.180 While certify-
ing one class of all investors may be appropriate in many cases, 
it is problematic when there is conflict between bondholder and 
shareholder interests.  
The trend of defining a broad class at the outset is partly 
motivated by the desire of plaintiffs’ attorneys to control the 
class action. If there is separate counsel for bondholders, the 
division of attorney fees might be affected as well as other is-
sues relating to settlement negotiations. When the interests of 
bondholders and shareholders are similar, having one class 
counsel for all publicly traded securities would be appropriate. 
Indeed, if the claims asserted by bondholders and shareholders 
are essentially the same, separate class counsel would create 
unnecessary costs.  
When a class of publicly traded securities is certified, a 
shareholder is usually appointed as the lead plaintiff. Bond-
 
into account this uncertainty. In the Xerox class action, the court discounted 
the bondholder recovery for secondary market fraud by 25%. It explained that 
the discount “is intended to recognize the somewhat greater difficulty a Bond 
purchaser faces compared to a purchaser of an equity security in showing the 
causal relationship between the allegedly misleading information and the 
claimed loss.” Preliminary Order for Notice and Hearing in Connection with 
Settlement Proceedings at 21 n.3, Carlson v. Xerox Corp, No. 3:00-CV-1621 
(AWT) (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2008). In the Qwest class action, the recovery dis-
count for some bonds was even greater, 90%, again reflecting the difficulty of 
proving reliance. Notice of Pendency and Partial Settlement of Class Action at 
8, In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inter. Inc. Sec. Litig., Civil Action No. 01-cv-
1451-REB-CBS (D. Colo. Jan. 5, 2006). The point is that rather than complete-
ly denying the claim, adjustments can be made to take into account the great-
er uncertainty with respect to damages suffered by bondholders. 
 179. As noted earlier, about half of securities class actions now allege such 
a class.  
 180. The court in the HealthSouth case certified a separate class of bond-
holders. In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 621 (N.D. Ala. 
2009).  
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holders tend to take on a lesser role as representative plaintiffs 
who are named in the complaint but have less control of the lit-
igation than the lead plaintiff.181 Shareholder dominance of the 
lead plaintiff position should not be surprising because as noted 
earlier, shareholders suffer greater losses from securities fraud 
than bondholders.182 Pursuant to the PSLRA, there is a pre-
sumption that the plaintiff with the largest loss should be the 
lead plaintiff.183  
Though the law is somewhat unclear,184 courts have al-
lowed a lead plaintiff to represent bondholders even when they 
have not bought the bonds at issue. For example, in the World-
Com case, the lead plaintiff was permitted to represent bond-
holders asserting section 11 claims though it had not purchased 
bonds in any primary offering.185 The court reasoned that the 
addition of representative plaintiffs who had invested in bonds 
in the relevant offerings ensured that the interest of such 
bondholders would be adequately represented.186  
In some cases, shareholders and bondholders have similar 
interests, but this Article has argued that in other cases share-
holders and bondholders are in different positions with respect 
to a securities fraud. When there is such a conflict, a share-
holder will not be an adequate representative of bondholder in-
terests as required by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.187 While the inclusion of bondholders as named 
 
 181. Of the 19 Largest Bondholder Settlements, there were 6 cases where 
the lead plaintiff was a shareholder and there were also bondholders appoint-
ed as representative plaintiffs. These cases included Enron, Xerox, Adelphia, 
Global Crossing, Delphi, and Williams Companies.  
 182. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. Another reason may be 
that some bondholders are reluctant to become involved in securities class ac-
tions. For example, insurance companies are significant holders of corporate 
bonds but tend not to become involved in securities class actions as lead plain-
tiffs. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An 
Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1587, 1609 (2006).  
 183. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (setting forth the rebuttable pre-
sumption that plaintiff with “largest financial interest in the relief sought” 
should be the lead plaintiff).  
 184.  See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (“There is conflicting case law in the Second Circuit on whether a court 
may certify a class of purchasers of a security or fund that was not also pur-
chased by Lead Plaintiffs.”), vacated and remanded by 689 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 
2012).  
 185. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 280–81 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
 186. Id. at 281.  
 187. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).  
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plaintiffs might lessen this concern, the reality is that the lead 
plaintiff has the power to dictate the terms of the settlement. 
The appropriate response would be to create a subclass of 
bondholders represented by their own counsel.188  
Bondholders should be part of their own subclass when 
there are particular allegations of conduct that defrauds bond-
holders. When it is clear that a complaint alleges claims that 
specifically affect bondholders, such as the fraudulent sale of 
bonds to perpetuate a fraud, or the concealment of debt to 
maintain a credit rating, it would not be appropriate for bond-
holders to be represented by a shareholder.189 Such a share-
holder is arguably a beneficiary of a fraud that transferred val-
ue from bondholders to shareholders.  
If bondholder interests are better represented in the set-
tlement process, bondholder recoveries would likely increase. 
As noted earlier, bondholders tend to recover less than share-
holders. The relatively low recoveries likely reflect the fact that 
bondholders are harmed less by fraud. However, it is also pos-
sible that the lower recoveries are partly a result of inadequate 
representation of bondholder interests in the settlement pro-
cess. If a shareholder is appointed as lead plaintiff, he has little 
incentive to allocate significant amounts to bondholders. Creat-
ing a subclass for bondholders would help ensure that bond-
holders recover appropriate amounts when the fraud transfers 
their wealth to shareholders.190  
 
 188. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (“When appropriate, an action may be 
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”). 
Though the rules are unclear as to when a subclass should be created, sub-
classes are meant to address concerns relating to adequacy of representation. 
See Scott Dodson, Subclassing, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2351, 2382–83 (2006).  
 189. A number of commentators have raised concern that class representa-
tives may not adequately represent the interests of other shareholders. See, 
e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
1109 (2011) (arguing that courts should appoint diverse groups of securities 
plaintiffs); David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securi-
ties Class Actions, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 157 (2012) (arguing that interests of in-
stitutional investors may conflict with interests of individual investors). Insti-
tutional investors, for example, can have different interests than retail 
investors. If institutional investors are typically chosen as the class repre-
sentative of securities class actions because they suffer the largest losses, they 
might resolve cases in a way inconsistent with other investors who tend to suf-
fer smaller losses. The potential conflict between bondholders and sharehold-
ers is likely even greater than between institutional and retail investors. 
 190. Larger recoveries by bondholders could lead to opportunistic behavior 
by class action attorneys. Counsel might claim that bondholders deserve re-
covery even when they do not in order to extract part of the settlement. Courts 
should scrutinize settlements closely to determine whether bondholders did in 
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A more radical way of assuring adequate representation of 
bondholder interests in securities class actions might be to pri-
oritize their recovery over shareholders in certain cases. If 
bondholder actions are a vehicle for checking excessive risk-
taking by shareholders, a case can be made that bondholders 
should be compensated for all of their damages before share-
holders receive any compensation, much as bondholders are 
paid before shareholders in bankruptcy.191 In particular, when 
the factual allegations establish that a fraud was driven by a 
desire to distribute wealth from bondholders to shareholders, 
one can argue that shareholders should not have the same 
claim to recovery as bondholders. If they receive priority over 
shareholders in certain cases, bondholders would have greater 
incentives to become involved in securities class actions, and 
such cases would be more potent in policing the conflict be-
tween shareholders and bondholders. Further development of 
this possibility might be appropriate for a future Article. 
  CONCLUSION   
 Securities class actions are no longer just for shareholders. 
Bondholder class actions represent an important evolution of 
the traditional securities class action. The significance of bond-
holder class actions has implications for the way academics, 
policymakers, and judges think about securities class actions as 
well as the role of bondholders in corporate governance. The 
rise of the bondholder class action reflects the significant socie-
tal implications of securities fraud during certain periods. A vi-
brant bondholder class action can provide a remedy for the 
worst shareholder excesses that harm the interests of corporate 
stakeholders. More should be done to ensure that the interests 
of bondholders are represented adequately in securities class 
actions, especially in cases where bondholders are the  
victims of a fraud that advances shareholder interests.
 
fact suffer losses from the fraud. 
 191. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2012).  
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Appendix: 
Table A1. Characteristics of 19 Largest Bondholder 
Recoveries  
Issuer Name Section 
11 
claims
Settling Defendants
Enron Corp. Yes Auditors; Underwriters; Directors  
WorldCom, Inc. Yes Auditors; Underwriters; Directors 
Officers
Tyco International 
Ltd. 
Yes Issuer, Auditor, Officers
 
AOL Time Warner, 
Inc. 
Yes Issuer, Auditor
 
American Interna-
tional Group Inc. 
Yes Issuer, Auditor, Starr Defendants 
McKesson HBOC, 
Inc. 
No Issuer, Auditor
 
Xerox Corp. No Issuer, Auditor
Lucent Technolo-
gies, Inc.  
No Issuer
 
HealthSouth Corp. Yes Issuer, Auditor, Underwriter 
 
Adelphia Commu-
nications Corp. 
Yes Auditor, Underwriter
Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. 
No Issuer
 
Qwest Communi-
cations Interna-
tional Inc. 
No Issuer, Auditor
Marsh & McLen-
nan Companies, 
Inc. 
Yes Issuer
Global Crossing, 
Ltd.  
Yes Auditor, Underwriter, Chairman  
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Delphi Corp. Yes Issuer, Auditor
Rite Aid Corp. No Auditor, CEO 
General Motors 
Corp. 
Yes Issuer, Auditor
Williams Compa-
nies, Inc. 
Yes Issuer, Auditor
 
El Paso Corp. Yes Issuer, Auditor
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Table A2. Various Summary Statistics for Cases In-
volving Bondholder Recoveries (1996-2005). 
Characteristic Number of Cases 
% of Bondholder 
Recoveries (64 ob-
servations)
Section 11 Claim 30 46.9 
Bankruptcy 30 46.9 
Credit Downgrade 32 50.0 
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Table A3. Identifiable Section 11 Bondholder Aver-
age Recoveries (not including attorney fees) 
Issuer Section 11 Recovery
WorldCom, Inc. $5,000,000,000
Tyco International Ltd. $250,000,000
HealthSouth Corp. $230,000,000
Conseco, Inc. $81,000,000
Delphi Corp. $54,000,000
American International Group,
Inc. 
$50,000,000
Safety-Kleen Corp. $45,000,000
Livent, Inc. $33,000,000
Owens Corning, Inc. $20,000,000
Just for Feet, Inc. $17,750,000
Hayes Lemmerz International, 
Inc.  
$15,000,000
Thaxton Entities $9,500,000
Levi Strauss & Co. $5,000,000
MobileMedia Communications, 
Inc. 
$4,950,000
First Merchants Acceptance 
Corp. 
$3,000,000
Fleming Companies, Inc. 
(1996) 
$2,500,000
Refco, Inc. $221.09 per $1000 bond 
Fleming Companies, Inc. (2002) $35.61 per $1000 bond
PMA Capital Corp. $20 per $1000 bond
First Merchants Acceptance 
Corp. 
$18.90 per $1000 bond
FirstEnergy Corp. $8.62 per $1000 bond
Exodus Communications, Inc. $5.60 per $1000 bond
Boston Chicken, Inc. $2 per $1000 bond
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Table A4. Identifiable Rule 10b-5 Average Recoveries 
(not including attorney fees) 
Issuer Rule 10b-5 Recovery
TXU Corp. $15,000,000
Waste Management, Inc. $10,200,000
Hayes Lemmerz International, 
Inc. 
$10,000,000
Sears Roebuck & Co. $10,000,000
Motorola, Inc. $9,500,000
Lucent Technologies, Inc. $3,750,000 (plus $4.6 million 
from common law claims) 
Reliance Group Holdings, Inc. $33.25 per $1000 bond
Northpoint Communications 
Group, Inc. 
$31.60 per $1000 bond
Global Crossing, Ltd. $13 per $1000 bond
Globix Corp. $8.29 per $1000 bond
Winstar Communications, Inc. $7.85 per $1000 bond
Collins & Aikman Corp. $6.50 per $1000 bond
ViroPharma, Inc. $5.95 per $1000 bond
Salton, Inc. $1.63 per $1000 bond
Dollar General Corp. $1.07 per $1000 bond
 
 
